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It is obvious there exist multiple alternative, conflicting representations of investing and 
investors in society. In fiction, investors, particularly professional ones, are often reserved 
the role of a bad guy: for instance, such iconic movies as Wall Street and The Wolf of 
Wall Street portraying, as suggested by their names, activities on Wall Street present pro-
fessional investors as selfish, immoral and power-hungry. Even Train to Busan, a Korean 
zombie action film, i.e. a film not about investing, introduces its main character, initially 
a selfish, immoral guy unconcerned for anyone else’s well-being but his own and sug-
gested to be at least indirectly responsible for the catastrophic events of the film and the 
deaths of hundreds of innocent people, as a fund manager who is commented to “just 
leech off other people”. In these representations, investing is very clearly bad and unde-
sirable behavior and has significant negative consequences ranging from imprisonment 
and the loss of everything one holds dear to death. In comparison, e.g. banks’ marketing 
materials present investing in a very positive light, portraying it as the smart and right 
way to manage one’ wealth and an activity appropriate for everyone, at least with the help 
of finance professionals who are valuable and skilled experts, while news most often por-
trays investing in a value-neutral, almost naturalistic way as an activity that “just hap-
pens” (Hirsto 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011).  
Individuals thus face multiple different, conflicting ways of conceiving and making 
sense of investing and financial markets and, as different representations suggest very 
different consequences, the decision to engage in investment activities is clearly not a 
value-neutral choice, but one influenced by social and cultural norms. As Preda (2001) 
argues, it will not do to assume that individuals have a natural propensity to invest or that 
it is their optimal choice to manage their wealth, and the mere existence of surplus money 
together with the necessary institutional and legal framework will not yet induce individ-
uals to engage in investing. There is, in fact, historical and current evidence against such 
claims. For example, in the 19th century England and France it took a radical change in 
discourse and representations of investing to change people’s propensity to invest (Preda 
2001). Further, currently in Finland, 60-80 % of population feels they do not possess 
adequate wealth to invest (Norvestia 2016, Nordea 2018). Even the majority (62 %) of 
those non-investors who earn over 80 000 euros a year report not having adequate wealth 
to invest. Only 33 % of the population agrees with the statement “anyone can invest” 
(Nordea 2018). It might be that these non-investors’ expenses are so high that they do not 
have adequate savings to invest or that their attitude towards risk prevents them from 
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investing, but it is also possible that their perceptions of what investing is like and who 
can invest influences their decision not to invest.  
Indeed, whether or not to invest is not a question of simply one’s surplus wealth and 
attitude towards risk but also of one’s identity and beliefs: if one perceives investing to 
be negative, socially undesirable behavior (e.g. selfish, immoral or irresponsible) and 
does not want to appear in such a light, they will refrain from investing even if their 
finances and risk attitude would allow for it, while if one considers investing as a socially 
legitimate or even desirable behavior (e.g. smart, responsible way to manage money), 
they will be inclined to invest. Therefore, it is essential to consider people, including in-
vestors or financial actors, as social beings, influenced by social and cultural forces such 
as (social) representations and discourses. 
Yet, investing as a socially and culturally affected activity is rarely explored in finance 
research. The traditional, neoclassical “mainstream” finance research typically models 
investors as (hyper)rational, selfish utility (or wealth) maximizers and ignores the poten-
tial social and cultural influences. Further, thinking in these studies tends to be atomistic 
as behavior of financial markets is assumed to be simply the aggregate of individuals’ 
behavior and decisions. Behavioral finance research has criticized some of these assump-
tions and aimed to further develop finance theories by allowing for investors’ bounded 
rationality and different cognitive biases, but the same atomistic thinking is still present 
in behavioral finance, too, and the potential social and cultural influences remain ignored.  
The emerging field of Social Studies of Finance (SSF) has attempted to meet this chal-
lenge and “socialize” finance by offering alternative perspectives (from e.g. sociology, 
anthropology, and political and cultural studies) into the field, emphasizing the cultural 
and social dimensions of financial activities. Yet these studies are still quite few in num-
ber and their contribution remains more or less anecdotal as there have been few attempts 
to develop a more comprehensive, holistic theory of investors’ behavior and decision-
making and bridge the gap between the traditional neoclassical finance and SSF. 
Interestingly, so far theories of social psychology have received relatively little atten-
tion from researchers studying investing and financial markets. This is surprising, con-
sidering the focus of social psychology is exactly to explain human behavior in social 
contexts. For example, social representation theory, which ties together the ideas of rep-
resentations, discourses and (social) identities as influencers and drives of human behav-
ior, offers an interesting theoretical framework for examining investors’ behavior. 
Private banking in particular presents an interesting setting to study investing as a so-
cial and cultural activity. Finance professionals in private banking work directly on the 
boundary between professional and non-professional investing. Private banking clients, 
i.e. non-professional investors, and private banking professionals such as asset/portfo-
lio/fund managers and private bankers, i.e. professional investors, do not necessarily 
share the same social representation of investing, and it is possible that the groups’ social 
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representations of investing are even conflicting. Further, the potential clients in private 
banking are so-called high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs), i.e. persons with high levels 
of income or sizable assets (Wikipedia 2018), suggesting that, for these people, lack of 
savings cannot be the reason not to invest; if they are non-investors there must be a non-
economic reason for it, such as perceiving investing in a negative way (e.g. as immoral, 
irresponsible, dangerous, or overly difficult). Thus, to be able to perform their job, private 
banking professionals might need to first overcome the potential conflicts of perceptions 
and negotiate a common understanding with their clients. Therefore, studying how these 
professionals perceive themselves as professionals, their work and investing in general 
might shed some light on what kind of social and cultural forces affect investing on the 
whole. 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to explore how Finnish private banking professionals per-
ceive themselves, their work and investing in general and, based on this, discuss what 
kind of social representations and ideologies these perceptions might result from. The 
study also examines whether there is any indication of the existence of multiple or even 
conflicting social representations of investing. In a broader sense, the aim of the study is 
to contribute to the understanding of investing as a social and cultural activity and how 
factors other than “rational” wealth-maximization might influence people’s investment 
decisions. 
In short, the study will address the following research questions:  
1) What are Finnish private banking professionals’ identities like?  
• What kind of roles they see as meaningful and important to adopt and 
perform in their work?  
• What kind of behavior and personal qualities are associated with the 
roles: what is deemed acceptable, required and essential, and what is 
deemed unacceptable for Finnish private banking professionals?  
• If there are any conflicts between the roles, personal qualities or behav-
ioral norms, how are these conflicts managed and solved?  
2) How do Finnish private banking professionals perceive investing in general?  
3) What kind of ideological and cultural underpinnings can be found in the per-
ceptions of Finnish private banking professionals? 
Theoretically the study draws upon the social representation theory of social psychol-
ogy, proposing an alternative perspective to finance and people’s investment behavior. 
By reviewing earlier research on the representations of investing, investors and financial 
markets and comparing them to the perceptions of Finnish private banking professionals, 
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this study attempts to tentatively map out the wider cultural context in which investors 
operate. Further, the potential implications of findings will be discussed. In many ways 
this study is an explorative one and should thus be regarded as suggestive rather than an 
end in itself.  
For the academic audience, the study offers an alternative perspective on investing and 
investment behavior, hopefully provoking thoughts and generating discussion about the 
limitations of, for example, the atomistic thinking prevailing in the mainstream and be-
havioral finance research and igniting more interest in the social, social psychological and 
cultural dimensions of financial activities and phenomena. For practitioners, this study 
offers an opportunity for critical self-reflection and potentially also self-improvement in 
their everyday working life. Making social representations “visible” by describing them 
might reveal the generally accepted and unquestioned values and assumptions which lie 
at the core of culture. Only by revealing these assumptions it is then possible to start 
questioning them and discussing whether or not they are meaningful and reasonable and 
if they should be changed for something (that is perceived) better. This, in turn, could 
potentially help with, for example, improving the soundness and efficiency of financial 
decisions made by financial actors, risk management in investing and the recruitment of 
new finance professionals. Further, understanding the potentially different social repre-
sentations of investing embraced and accepted by non-professionals might help private 
banking professionals to communicate better with their clients and to provide them with 
better financial advice. 
1.3 Key terms and definitions 
In this study, the term “identity” refers to meanings one attributes to oneself in a role and 
that others attribute to one. By categorizing oneself as something (e.g. a student, a mother, 
an investor, a finance professional), an individual will assume the identity of that some-
thing and start behaving in a way they believe that something should behave. Likewise, 
in order to not be (some identity), one must not act like (some identity). In role relevant 
situations others will react to a person as a performer of the role and the person’s actions 
will be judged to be appropriate or inappropriate for that particular role (Burke & Reitzes 
1981). Thus, an identity is always socially constructed in communication with others 
(Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006), and this poses limits to how freely one can opt 
in and out of identities: in the construction or making sense of one’s identity, one has to 
incorporate, negotiate and/or contest representations of relevant social groups (Howarth 
2002).  
9 
Thus, in a way, identification and representation can be seen as “different sides of the 
same coin” (Howarth 2002) and identities are closely related to the idea of social repre-
sentations. In this study the term “representation” refers to the way an object is shown or 
described, i.e. a portrayal of an object in a certain way. The term “social representation”, 
on the other hand, refers to the stock of ideas, thoughts, feelings, images and knowledge 
of an object, (i.e. a representation) shared by a particular social group, the so-called “com-
mon sense” understanding that is socially created and communicated and which thus con-
stitutes the object for that group. Social representations function to conventionalize ob-
jects, persons and events: they are prescriptive and have value connotations, and therefore 
shape and guide people’s beliefs, attitudes, opinions and behavior. Often people are una-
ware of the social representations they embrace and accept, and simply see them as “com-
mon sense”. Importantly, however, the relationship between an individual and the social 
group embracing certain social representations is a dialectical one: the individual is sim-
ultaneously both a product of the social group (its conventions, norms, values, etc. con-
veyed by the social representations) and an active participant in the construction of the 
social representations shared by the group (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006; Tay-
lor, Murray & Lamont 2017). 
Lastly, in this study, the term “private banking professional” refers to those finance 
professionals who work within the sphere of private banking. Private banking consists of 
banking, investment and other financial services provided to the so-called high-net-worth 
individuals (HNWIs), i.e. persons with high levels of income or sizable assets (Wikipedia 
2018). In this study, the minimum wealth of a HNWI is 100 000–300 000 €. 
1.4 Methodology and limitations 
This study pursues a qualitative methodology. This approach was chosen, first, because 
there is little prior knowledge on the topic, making quantitative methods inappropriate to 
use as no testable hypotheses could be formed, whereas qualitative methodology allows 
for the collection of thick, nuanced data, which supports building a holistic, detailed un-
derstanding of the topic (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). Second, the purpose of the study 
is to explore the identities and subjective perceptions of Finnish private banking profes-
sionals and thus investigate the construction of investing activities as a social and cultural 
phenomenon. Therefore, qualitative methodology is particularly appropriate as it, unlike 
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quantitative methodology, allows for the assumption of reality as socially constructed1 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). 
As this study assumes the reality is socially constructed, the study is interpretive, 
meaning the analysis and the results of this study are the researcher’s interpretation of the 
data, i.e. simply one possible way of making sense of it. Further, the sample size in the 
study is relatively small (eight people) and, as the interviewees were chosen based on 
access, the sample is very likely to be not representative of all private banking profes-
sionals. Thus, the study does not produce (statistically) generalizable results, but rather 
introduces new perspectives and starts building a knowledge base onto which further re-
search will be possible. 
Lastly, this study focuses on the perceptions of private banking professionals who 
work directly with clients. Their perceptions might differ from the ones of other private 
banking professionals, such as analysts, traders, or portfolio/asset/fund managers who do 
not work directly with their clients or who invest the bank’s assets. Further, their percep-
tions might also differ from the ones of other finance professionals (e.g. working in in-
vestment banking, insurance, etc.), from the ones of non-professional private investors 
and from the ones of non-investors. Therefore, the results of this study should not be 
regarded as representative of any other social group than the one specified by the study, 
and even then the results should be considered tentative and mainly suggestive for further 
research. 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical foun-
dation of the study by first shortly describing the individualistic, atomistic perspectives 
prevailing in the mainstream and behavioral finance research and discussing their limita-
tions and by then presenting alternative perspectives from social psychology along with 
earlier research literature on the representations and discourses of investing, investors and 
financial markets. Next, chapter 3 describes the empirical data and methodology used in 
this study. The following chapter 4 presents the empirical results of the study and chapter 
                                                 
1 In social constructionism it is assumed that there is no one, absolute truth but instead multiple ways of 
perceiving and explaining (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). For example, even such seemingly objective 
concepts as “investing” can be, as shown in chapter 2.3, constituted in multiple different ways using differ-
ent discourses and rhetorical devices. In social constructionism, language is thus thought to be performative, 
i.e. it does not purely describe the reality but instead has consequences (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008): by 
naming an object or an event, it is infused with meaning and therefore naming and describing objects are 
not neutral acts but they create and change the reality (cf. SIT, SRT and DP as presented in chapter 2.2). 
For example, as mentioned in chapter 2.2, by calling an act of violence on civilians a terrorist attack portrays 
the event and those responsible for it differently than calling it, for instance, simply “a bombing” or “a 
stabbing”, which (potentially) affects how people make sense of the event and respond to it. 
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5 continues with a more general discussion on the topic. Finally, chapter 6 concludes with 
a summary, evaluation of the study and some proposed topics for future research. 
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2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
2.1 Investors as individuals 
The foundation of the present day “mainstream” finance theories lies in the so-called ne-
oclassical period of economics and finance research that began circa 1930. These theories 
build on the neoclassical economics’ idea of the market being an aggregate of individual 
market actors’, (i.e. in finance, investors’), behavior.  
In short, the basis for the theories goes as follows. Investors are assumed to have pref-
erences, be able and willing to rank those preferences, and be rational and consistent in 
their choices, i.e. always choose the more preferred option over the less preferred. Inves-
tors are assumed to aim to maximize their happiness or “utility” and thus any risky deci-
sion-making problem (e.g. investing) can be modelled as a simple calculation of the ex-
pected utilities of each possible choice and the selection of the one offering the highest 
expected utility. The matter is further simplified by assuming more wealth is preferred 
over less wealth, thus equating utility maximization with wealth maximization (Elton et 
al. 2010). 
As markets are assumed to be highly liquid, i.e. there is a large number of investors 
freely trading on the market, no one investor is able to influence the prices and must 
therefore take the market price as a given. In other words, the prices are determined au-
tomatically “by the market”, as the result of supply and demand. Due to the assumptions 
of wealth maximization and rationality of investors, there can be no arbitrage opportuni-
ties, leading to the law of one price (i.e. two assets with identical payoffs must sell for the 
same price) and the fact that all instruments must be “correctly” priced (i.e. the price 
reflects the fundamentals of the company and the investors’ expectations for the future) 
(Elton et al. 2010, Ross 2005). 
In summary, in this mainstream finance literature, the view of investors is that of a 
(hyper)rational (economic) utility maximizer. Any other motives than wealth maximiza-
tion are assumed away; the theories do not necessarily claim investors cannot have other 
motives, but due to the assumptions of liquidity of the market and wealth maximization 
of investors, these other motives do not matter: if someone chooses to engage in an eco-
nomically suboptimal trade (due to other motives), other investors will jump at the op-
portunity, correcting the price immediately (Ross 2005). Investors are assumed to act in 
a socio-psychological vacuum: completely independent of each other and fully rationally, 
calculating the expected utility of each possible choice, selecting the highest expected 
utility and then executing the decision correctly. The view is thus highly individualistic 
and atomistic. 
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The assumptions of investor behavior behind the neoclassical theory were criticized 
even in the beginning as unrealistic: the idea of a perfectly rational decision-maker, who 
has preferences of everything, is able and willing to rank those preferences, and always 
acts consistently in his choices, is not supported by empirical evidence or even everyday 
experiences of most people. Yet multiple different arguments have been offered in a de-
fense of the mainstream finance theory. 
Firstly, Ross (2005) notes that the neoclassical theories are not even concerned with 
the behavior of individual investors, only with that of the whole markets, and as long as 
there are even some rational and well-financed investors on the market, they will ensure 
there are no arbitrage opportunities, i.e. other investors’ possible irrationality will not 
affect the prices or the behavior of the market. However, is it justified to assume there 
will be (enough of) those rational and well-financed investors? At least theoretically it is 
not difficult to imagine a situation where a very well-financed investor will engage in an 
economically suboptimal trade (e.g. due to personal values or a need to get liquidity) and 
there are investors, who observe this arbitrage opportunity but lack the resources to ex-
ploit it. Further, Ross’s argument is based on the idea of atomistic investors, i.e. that in-
vestors do not influence each other. In reality, however, investors have been observed to, 
for instance, engage in herd behavior (see e.g. Bohl, Branger & Trede 2017), gravitating 
towards the same or similar decisions. Economic bubbles are often mentioned as an ex-
ample of herd behavior, and thus it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a large 
number of investors engages in economically suboptimal trades and the few investors 
who “anti-herd” are not able to fully arbitrage away the “mispricings”. Thus, it will not 
do just to assume that there will be investors to nullify any “misbehavior” on the market; 
it may equally well be that this is not the case. 
Secondly, and admittedly, it is important to note that there are assumptions behind 
every theory; theory is always a simplification and an abstraction of the complex reality. 
How important it is that these assumptions are realistic is debatable. According to Fried-
man (1953), the value of any theory is not dependent on the realism of its assumptions 
but on how correct its predictions are. Thus, a “pragmatic” take would be that the neo-
classical finance theory is not descriptive, but a normative model of investor behavior, 
i.e. it provides suggestions and guidelines on how to behave, but does not reflect the re-
ality as it is in the financial markets. Problems arise, when this is forgotten and the models 
of the neoclassical finance theory are assumed to correctly describe the reality and that 
they can be used to give guidance or forecasts (e.g. to politicians) on how the markets or 
investors behave in certain conditions (Elton et al. 2010). 
However, one may ask whether finance, or any field of science for the matter, should 
only focus on creating normative models. What good are normative models, if we do not 
know how people actually behave (e.g. whether they act accordingly to the normative 
models and, if not, why)? To make value judgements, i.e. pronouncements on whether 
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something is good or right, a normative theory has to be based on or operate within a set 
of norms or prevailing beliefs; therefore, to develop a normative theory, a descriptive one 
is also needed: to improve something, one must first know, how it is. Further, as men-
tioned above, normative models cannot be used to give forecasts or guidance to e.g. policy 
makers; a descriptive model would be needed for that.  
On the basis of the critique presented above, behavioral finance has attempted to de-
velop a more realistic view of people’s investment behavior. Behavioral finance (BF) can 
be defined as “the study of the influence of psychology on the behavior of financial prac-
titioners and the subsequent effect on markets” (Sewell 2007) and, drawing mainly on 
theories from cognitive psychology, BF allows investors to have bounded rationality and 
their behavior to be influenced by emotions. While most of the research2 within BF to 
date has dealt with the examination of individual “anomalies”3 as well as heuristics4 and 
the biases resulting from them, the field has produced also some more comprehensive 
theories of financial actors’ decision-making, most notably the theory of mental account-
ing (Thaler 1980) and the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979).  
Mental accounting refers to the tendency to categorize and classify one’s personal 
funds instead of treating them all equally as one portfolio (e.g. considering each invest-
ment individually and not as a part of the whole investment portfolio, or having different 
investment goals for different sums invested) (Thaler 1980). In a similar vein, according 
to the prospect theory, people are prone to be influenced by the framing of the situation: 
e.g. unexpected taxes may be treated as losses instead of diminished profits, while finan-
cial losses in a bad economy may be considered gains, if the losses are smaller than others 
have experienced. Prospect theory also suggests people are generally risk averse, favoring 
certain gains over uncertain ones even when the expected value of uncertain gains is big-
ger than the one of certain gains, and concern themselves more with gains and losses than 
final assets. Further, according to prospect theory, people’s risk preferences are not con-
sistent and gains and losses are treated differently: when winning, people are increasingly 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive review of the most notable research done in behavioral finance, see e.g. Sewell 
(2007). 
3 Anomalies as considered from the neoclassical finance point of view, i.e. stock market deviations from 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama 1970) and the Capital Asset Pricing Models (e.g. Black 1972, Lint-
ner 1965, Sharpe 1964, and others). Well-known “anomalies” include, for example, and the endowment 
effect (the tendency to demand a higher price for a product owned than one would be prepared to pay to 
buy it) (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1990), and calendar effects such as the January effect (the tendency 
of returns on common stocks in January to be much higher than in other months) and the weekend effect 
(the tendency of stocks to exhibit relatively large returns on Fridays compared to those on Mondays). 
4 Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts, so-called “rules of thumb” that make information processing easier and 
quicker for people’s limited cognitive capabilities. Well-known heuristics include, for example, the affect 
heuristic (i.e. the effect of feelings of decisions) (Finucane et al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2002), the availability 
heuristic (the tendency to rely on information readily available instead of considering other alternatives) 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1973), and the recognition heuristic (the tendency to judge recognized objects to be 
of higher value compared to objects not recognized) (Goldstein & Gigerenzer 1999). 
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risk averse, but when losing, they become risk seekers trying to regain lost funds (Kahne-
man & Tversky 1979). 
All in all, according to mental accounting and the prospect theory, investors are not 
fully rational, but instead are prone to make emotional, economically suboptimal deci-
sions as well as be influenced by the framing of the situation due to having limited cog-
nitive capabilities. The same theme repeats across most behavioral finance literature: BF 
research is built on the critique towards the rationality assumptions made in neoclassical 
finance research and therefore BF research draws heavily on the theories and observations 
from the cognitive psychology in an attempt to allow for bounded rationality. While un-
deniably important and useful in getting a more realistic theory of investors’ behavior, 
this view is still lacking: in the end, cognitive psychology is just as individualistic and 
atomistic as the neoclassical theory, failing to consider the social and cultural aspects of 
financial activities. 
To summarize, the neoclassical finance literature’s view of investors is atomistic and 
individualistic: they are assumed to be fully rational wealth maximizers. In behavioral 
finance investors are allowed to be not fully rational; they are assumed to be cognitively 
bounded, i.e. they would act rationally, if they could, but because of their limited cogni-
tive capabilities and proneness to emotional responses, they make economically subopti-
mal decisions. This view, while more realistic, is still just as individual and atomistic, and 
does not allow for the consideration of an investor as a social being who lives embedded 
in a certain social and cultural environment.  
2.2 Socializing the investor  
As Preda (2001) argues, it will not do to assume that individuals have a natural propensity 
to invest or that it is their optimal choice to manage their wealth. There is, in fact, histor-
ical and current evidence against such claims. For example, in the 19th century England 
and France it took a radical change in discourse and representations of investing to change 
people’s propensity to invest (Preda 2001). Further, currently in Finland, 60-80 % of pop-
ulation feels they do not possess adequate wealth to invest (Norvestia 2016, Nordea 
2018). Even the majority (62 %) of those non-investors who earn over 80 000 euros a 
year report not having adequate wealth to invest, and only 33 % of the population agrees 
with the statement “anyone can invest” (Nordea 2018). It might be that these non-inves-
tors’ expenses are so high that they do not have adequate savings to invest or that their 
attitude towards risk prevents them from investing, but it is also possible that their per-
ceptions of what investing is like and who can invest influences their decision not to in-
vest. As Preda (2001) argues, the mere existence of surplus money together with the nec-
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essary institutional and legal framework will not yet induce individuals to engage in in-
vesting; instead, investing will need to be considered at least a socially acceptable and 
legitimate activity. Therefore, it is essential to consider people, including investors or 
financial actors, as social beings, influenced by social and cultural forces such as (social) 
representations and discourses. 
The emerging field of Social Studies of Finance (SSF) has attempted to “socialize” 
finance by offering alternative perspectives (from e.g. sociology, anthropology, and po-
litical and cultural studies) into finance research, emphasizing the material, cultural and 
social dimensions of financial activities. For instance, research topics such as the culture 
and work habits of finance professionals (e.g. Abolafia 1997, Hertz 1998, Sjöberg 2004), 
gender (e.g. McDowell 1997), the role of technology and mainstream finance theories 
(e.g. MacKenzie & Millo 2003, MacKenzie 2006, Millo & Schinckus 2016), discourses 
of finance (e.g. Sjöberg 2004; Hirsto 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011; Fuchs & Graf 2010) and 
globalization (e.g. Cerny 1994, Cohen 1996) have been studied. However, as a young, 
truly interdisciplinary field, SSF most often treats financial markets as a research context, 
drawing on theories from other subject matters and without attempting to bridge together 
mainstream finance research and SSF research.  
Interestingly, so far theories of social psychology, aside from those within the social 
cognition approach, have received relatively little attention from researchers studying in-
vesting and financial markets. This is surprising, considering the focus of social psychol-
ogy is exactly to explain the human behavior in social contexts. 
Within social psychology, there are four major schools of thought, the dominant of 
which is social cognition, a perspective that focuses on intraindividual mental processes5, 
drawing heavily on the mini theories and concepts of cognitive psychology. Similar to 
the views in neoclassical finance and BF, social cognition explains social phenomena by 
thinking of people as information processors: like “naïve scientists” people make sense 
of the world around them by making observations of systematic variations and then mak-
ing inferences based on these observations. However, as truly scientific thinking is ex-
tremely taxing, people tend to be “cognitive misers” who avoid becoming overwhelmed 
by the amount and complexity of social stimuli by utilizing different heuristics. Yet, peo-
ple are capable of abandoning these heuristics and thinking deeply instead when so mo-
tivated (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006). 
In their cognitive processes people construct mental representations, schemas. Sche-
mas are mental templates or categories that contain generalized expectations and 
knowledge of the world, e.g. what to expect and how to behave in certain (social) situa-
tions and roles. Thus, by categorizing, schemas simplify the complex world and allow 
people to interact without having to treat each object and situation individually. Schemas 
                                                 
5 Thus, somewhat ironically, as a discipline social psychology is not exempt from problems of atomistic, 
individualistic thinking (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006). 
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are also evaluative and affective, offering normative guidance for behavior and poten-
tially triggering certain feelings (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006). 
In a sharp contrast to this, social identity theory (SIT), another major school of thought 
within social psychology, in based on the idea of behavior being guided by an individual’s 
social group identity (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006). Identities can be defined 
as meanings one attributes to oneself in a role and that others attribute to one; in a way 
then, an identity is a portrayal or a representation of sorts. By categorizing oneself as 
something (e.g. a student, a mother, an investor, a finance professional), an individual 
will assume the identity of that something and start behaving in a way they believe that 
something should behave. Likewise, in order to not be (some identity), one must not act 
like (some identity). Behavioral choices might be on the level of activities or in the man-
ner in which the activities are performed. In role relevant situations others will react to a 
one as a performer of the role and one’s actions will be judged to be appropriate or inap-
propriate for that particular role (Burke & Reitzes 1981). 
Thus, in SIT categorization is not viewed as a simplifying cognitive process but as an 
enriching and elaborating sense-making activity that renders the complex world more in-
telligible: by categorizing an object as something, it is not stripped of complexity, but 
instead infused with meaning and relevance. Further, according to SIT people are moti-
vated to think well of themselves and are thus motivated to identify with and belong to a 
group they see as superior to others and to positively distinguish their ingroup, i.e. the 
social group they belong to, from other social groups (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 
2006). 
However, it should also be noted that an identity is always socially constructed in 
communication with others, restricting the availability of identities to an individual. 
While one might identify with a particular social group, its membership is not always 
easily acquired and, on the other hand, one might belong to some social groups against 
one’s wishes: for example, transmen identify as men, but are assigned as women at birth 
and are often perceived as such by others, causing these men considerable stress 
(Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006). An unwanted or negatively perceived identity, 
either acquired by behaving in a way that corresponds to such an identity (e.g. a criminal) 
or by being labeled as such based on inescapable personal attributes (e.g. a disabled per-
son), can thus be seen to threaten or even spoil6 one’s positive identity and, as according 
to SIT people strive to think well of themselves, such a negative identity must be some-
how managed. 
                                                 
6 The term “spoiled identity” refers to an identity of a stigmatized social group, such as e.g. an ethnic, 
religious or sexual minority. A stigma refers to a socially discrediting attribute, behavior or reputation that 
causes an individual to be classified by others in undesirable and rejected (Goffman 1963). 
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Social representations theory (SRT), the third major school of thought within social 
psychology, extends the perspective of SIT by examining the content and origin of (so-
cial) categories. As mentioned above, there are limits to how freely one can opt in and 
out of identities: in the construction or making sense of one’s identity, one has to incor-
porate, negotiate and/or contest representations of relevant social groups. Thus, in a way, 
identification and representation can be seen as “different sides of the same coin” 
(Howarth 2002). 
In SRT the term “social representation” refers to the stock of ideas, thoughts, feelings, 
images and knowledge of an object shared by a particular social group, i.e. the so-called 
“common sense” understanding that is socially created in communication and which thus 
constitutes the object for that group. Social representations (e.g. stereotypes) function to 
conventionalize objects, persons and events: people make sense of the unfamiliar by giv-
ing it meaning, and social representations guide this process, because people search for 
meaning among what they already know. First, in the process of anchoring, unfamiliar 
objects, events or other social stimuli are categorized by comparing them with existing 
stock of familiar categories, making them recognizable, comprehensible and possible to 
evaluate. Secondly, through objectification, the unknown and abstract attains a specific 
form: a social representation is constructed by constructing an icon or a metaphor to stand 
for the new unfamiliar object or event (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006; Taylor, 
Murray & Lamont 2017). For example, as described in chapter 2.3, stock market can be 
constructed as a casino, a market place like any other, a complex system of unchangeable 
and discoverable mechanics and laws, a natural resource to be utilized or a challenging 
terrain difficult for non-professionals to enter and navigate.  
Much like schemas in social cognition, social representations are prescriptive and have 
value connotations, shaping and guiding individual’s beliefs, attitudes, opinions and be-
havior (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006; Taylor, Murray & Lamont 2017). Social 
representations also function as a unifying and homogenizing force, making social groups 
what they are: those who share the social representation (of something) will agree in their 
understanding and evaluations of it (McKinlay, Potter & Wetherell 1993), behaving in a 
similar way in regard to it. Thus, through socialization into a particular social group, an 
individual attains not only the content of social knowledge of that group, but also the 
group’s dominant ways of thinking. 
Although a schema and a social representation are similar in some ways, there is an 
important difference: schemas are always inside individuals’ minds, thus subjective and 
unique to each individual, while social representations exist “out there”, independent of 
individuals and shared by them. Often people are unaware of the social representations 
they embrace and accept, and simply see them as “common sense”. Importantly, however, 
the relationship between an individual and the social group embracing certain social rep-
resentations is a dialectical one: the individual is simultaneously both a product of the 
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social group (its conventions, norms, values, etc. conveyed by the social representations) 
and an active participant in the construction of the social representations shared by the 
group (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006). 
Communication and the construction of categories in different social contexts is the 
focus of discursive psychology (DP), the fourth major school of thought within social 
psychology. In DP language is not seen to passively reflect the reality, but to actively 
construct it. In communication people draw on discourses or discursive resources that can 
be defined as specific, culturally shared, fairly established ways of talking and thinking 
about something (i.e. established “clusters” of certain terms, metaphors, arguments and 
other linguistic devices) through which different social phenomena and actions can be 
perceived as meaningful (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006, Hirsto 2007). Social 
categories are regarded in DP as discursive resources people might draw on and catego-
rizing itself is seen as something people do in communication to accomplish social actions 
(e.g. persuasion, blaming, denial, accusation, legitimizing, etc.) (Augoustinos, Walker & 
Donaghue 2006).  
For example, calling an act of violence on civilians “a terrorist attack” portrays the 
event and those responsible for it differently than calling it, for instance, simply “a bomb-
ing” or “a stabbing”. Further, while “a terrorist attack” most likely evokes quite similar 
associations and feelings among people, such the terms as “a capitalist” or “a communist”, 
for instance, might mean different things for different social groups and in different con-
texts: a left-wing supporter might use the term “capitalist” as a pejorative for right-wing 
supporters, implying they are selfish profit maximizing elite uninterested in the well-be-
ing of the common people, while for right-wing supporters the term does not carry any 
negative connotations, simply meaning an investor or someone who supports capitalism. 
For right-wingers, the term “communist” may instead be a pejorative, while for the left-
wingers it is not. Further, for instance in scientific texts both terms can be neutral and 
objective terms without any evaluative dimensions. 
Discourses may also have unintended consequences their users are not aware of and, 
furthermore, much of the time people do not strategically plan their use of discourses in 
a Machiavellian fashion, but instead just do what comes naturally (McKinlay, Potter & 
Wetherell 1993). Indeed, discourses are socially, culturally and historically shaped and 
if/when some of them become familiar and pervasive enough (i.e. so-called hegemonic 
discourses), they become regarded as direct representations of reality, not just versions of 
it (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006). Thus, discourses are related to power and 
can be seen as a window to the cultural and social phenomena underlying people’s be-
havior: discourses legitimize and naturalize certain perspectives and pieces of knowledge 
as well as construct specific subject positions and norms for behavior (Augoustinos, 
Walker & Donaghue 2006, Hirsto 2007, Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008).  
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The term “subject position” parallels those of “a role” or “an identity” in social psy-
chology but emphasizes more strongly the idea of multiple fluid and dynamic selves and 
stresses the importance of context (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue 2006, Hirsto 2007, 
Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). For example, in role specific situations, such as doctor’s 
appointment, the roles of a doctor and of a patient frame the communication and other 
behavior. As a patient, one allows a stranger performing the role of the doctor to ask 
personal questions and invade one’s personal space, a behavior that would not normally 
be allowed from a stranger. Yet even within this role specific situation, the roles of a 
doctor and of a patient can be constructed in multiple alternative ways, leaving differing 
possibilities for communication and other behavior. For example, traditionally the role of 
“a patient” has been quite passive: a patient simply describes their symptoms to a doctor 
who then makes a diagnosis and prescribes treatment, which the patient accepts. Trans-
forming the role of a patient discursively into that of “a customer” will result in different 
possibilities for communication and behavior. Customers are usually perceived to be ac-
tive and in the position of power as they are the ones paying and may, if they so choose, 
decide not to engage in any trade. Thus, the role of a “customer-patient” might provide 
one with freedom to, for example, question and challenge the diagnosis and prescribed 
treatment or demand more testing. 
In summary, social psychology thus offers multiple perspectives on individual’s be-
havior in social contexts. Notably, these perspectives are not entirely conflicting and can, 
to a degree, be integrated for a more comprehensive view. A common theme of represen-
tations can be found across the different perspectives within social psychology: one does 
not react to objects and events as they are but as one perceives and interprets them, i.e. 
one reacts to representations of objects and events. While in social cognition and SIT 
these representations reside within individuals’ minds, in SRT and DP they exist inde-
pendently of individual people and are culturally shared by different groups.  
SRT ties together the ideas of (social group) identity, social representations and dis-
courses. Culturally shared representations play a role in individuals’ identity construction 
(and therefore behavior): we are ultimately not free to choose who we are, i.e. how we 
perceive ourselves and how others perceive us, but social representations limit the identity 
we can construct. We have to incorporate, negotiate and/or contest social representations 
of relevant social groups: they can be passively accepted, but also actively challenged 
(e.g. negative representations and spoiled identities can be managed by drawing upon or 
constructing alternative representations). Importantly, social representations regarded as 
“the truth” differ from one social group to another, complicating the matter further. 
Both identities and social representations are constructed in communication, thus un-
avoidably utilizing some of the variety of available discourses: whenever communication 
takes place, a perspective or “a lens” must be chosen, and this choice determines which 
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discourses or discursive resources are used. As said, discourses are highly context sensi-
tive as well as performative, i.e. constructed to accomplish specific actions, yet much of 
the time, people are not using discourses strategically but instead only following their 
common sense and doing what comes naturally, thus revealing in the process what they 
regard as “natural”, “normal” and “the reality”. In other words, discourses can be used as 
clues to social representations: analyzing discourses and their use allows examining and 
describing social representations, making “hidden truths” of a particular social/cultural 
group visible7.  
Thus, all in all, people’s investment behavior, and even the choice whether or not to 
become an investor, can be perceived to be influenced by the (multiple, alternative) rep-
resentations of investing, investors, financial markets and finance as a field. Notably, even 
finance itself as a field is socially constructed: the theoretical, neoclassical models taught 
in universities and finance text books treat investing as a cognitive task, i.e. wealth max-
imization problem, and this perspective shapes the way sophisticated investors think 
about and perceive financial decision-making and prices because, as said, through social-
ization into a particular social group (such as finance professionals), an individual attains 
not only the content of social knowledge of that group, but also the group’s dominant 
ways of thinking. For example, in neoclassical finance theories the focus is on optimizing 
the profit in regard to risk (i.e. investing is perceived solely in terms of risk and profit) 
and for example wider societal effects of investing go largely ignored (i.e. investing is 
regarded as an individualistic, socially unproblematic activity). However, unsophisticated 
investors, who are not familiar with the neoclassical finance models and theories, might 
perceive investing differently; their social representations might be predominantly influ-
enced by other discourses and representations of finance, for example those prevailing in 
news media and fiction (such as novels, movies, etc.).  
The power of representations can be seen, for example, in the following thought-exer-
cise. In our western society, wealth is generally regarded as desirable, but greed and self-
ishness are seen as sins. Similarly, being intelligent, responsible and smart are generally 
perceived as socially desirable qualities while irresponsibility and foolishness are not. 
Thus, if investing is portrayed as similar to gambling, for instance, it will be associated 
with high risk, an opportunity to become wealthy very quickly, pleasure-seeking or thrill-
seeking, and irresponsible use of money. Such an activity might not be socially desirable 
for most people, except possibly as a way to have some fun. In contrast, if investing is 
represented as a sophisticated pastime requiring intelligence as well as specific 
                                                 
7 In practice, for example, when an interviewee goes beyond answering a question, i.e. offers additional 
information that was not specifically asked for, it happens for a reason, e.g. the interviewee feels they need 
to justify or defend their opinion because it goes against cultural or social expectations. Similarly, when no 
explanation is given and something is instead constructed discursively as naturalistic and factual, it may be 
either because the speaker tries to persuade and convince others of their opinion or because the speaker 
views their opinion, the discursive representation of the object, as the reality. 
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knowledge and skills, it might be perceived in a more favorable way, but also as some-
thing only possible for those who possess sufficient intellect and the needed skills. Lastly, 
if investing is represented as simply business like any other or even the smart and respon-
sible way to manage one’s finances, it not only becomes socially acceptable and possible 
for anyone, but even a moral responsibility of all individuals. 
Yet representations and discourses are not meaningless in professional investing ei-
ther. If profit-making is emphasized and investing is portrayed as a “game” or a “compe-
tition”, qualities such as ambitiousness, aggressiveness, ruthlessness, relentlessness and 
having a strong fighting spirit appear as necessary for professional investors. Also team 
spirit might be important, if the “investing game” is perceived to be a team sport instead 
of an individual performance. However, if rational analyzing and optimizing profits in 
regard to risk are emphasized instead and investing is portrayed as an intellectual prob-
lem-solving and (hyper)rational decision-making activity, qualities such as analytical 
mind, high intellect and cool collectedness are much more important. Therefore, each 
discourse and representation will determine what kind of behavior will be tolerated, what 
will be most valued and what will be regarded as negative or unacceptable. 
2.3 Representations of investing 
The existing literature on the representations or discourses of investing, financial markets 
and financial actors can be described as scarce, scattered across multiple disciplines and 
heterogeneous in research questions and objectives. Particularly noticeable is the absence 
of finance as a research discipline; most of the studies are sociological, political, cultural 
or linguistic studies. Additionally, since the research is scattered and heterogeneous in 
objectives, empirical findings remain isolated and anecdotal, making it hard to make out 
the bigger picture, let alone create a more formal, integrative theory to draw together the 
findings and provide a foundation for further research in the area. 
Of particular importance to this study are the studies by Preda (2001), Sjöberg (2004), 
and Hirsto (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011) which all discuss the portrayal of financial market, 
financial actors and investing, and Sjöberg’s study also how finance professionals of Wall 
Street perceive themselves and their work. Additionally, Fuchs and Graf’s (2010) study 
is closely related: they analyze the construction of the financial crisis of 2008 and its core 
actors in German public discourse, providing more empirical evidence on the representa-
tions of financial markets and actors in media.  
Firstly, Preda’s (2001) examination of how investing became a popular and socially 
desirable activity in the 19th century England and France provides us with two conflicting 
representations of investing, investors and financial actors: (1) that of an immoral specu-
lator gambling away at a casino, and (2) that of a smart, responsible and patriotic man 
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engaging in a respectable trade in a market place like any other. There are also features 
of a third representation which is the one embraced by the neoclassical finance theories: 
that of a (hyper)rational calculator operating in the world of economic laws and mecha-
nisms because not doing so would be economically suboptimal and therefore unwise.  
According to Preda (2001), prior to (and even after) 1840s the financial markets were 
considered problematic in England and France. In the 17th and 18th centuries the English 
and French financial markets were first and foremost created in an attempt of the states 
to gather funds without having to resort to costly loans from private bankers, i.e. public 
credit was seen as a better alternative to private credit. However, after the attempts to 
regulate the markets failed and legal bans proved ineffective, the financial markets were 
considered the enemy of the state. Moreover, as the financial markets allowed different 
social classes to mix freely8 (provided they had the money to invest) and, as the investors 
tended to spend the whole day at the financial marketplace and “abandon themselves to 
the pleasures of financial speculation”, financial markets were perceived to undermine 
the morals of citizens (Preda 2001). Effectively, the financial markets were seen as a “ca-
sino” and investing was equated with gambling, making it socially unattractive for most 
respectable common people. 
An alternative representation emerged in the early to middle 19th century. While pub-
lications describing the activities on the financial markets had started to appear already in 
the late 18th century, in the 1840s the number of financial publications (e.g. manuals, 
advice brochures, newspaper reports, histories of the market) dedicated to the public at 
large “almost exploded”. Most importantly, the tone of these publications was educa-
tional: they approached the financial market in terms of analysis and explanation, offering 
a cognitive, not moralizing perspective on investing and markets. The publications of-
fered not only the vocabulary and the practical knowledge of how the bourse worked9 
needed to engage in finance activities, but also described the determination of assets’ 
prices and interest rates, simulated market situations through (mathematical) problem 
solving, as well as analyzed and discussed business statements. Market charts, (daily) 
price listings and visual representations of historical price movements also made their 
appearance in the 1830s–1870s (Preda 2001). 
These publications effectively turned financial markets into objects of knowledge and 
analysis: investing was neither sorcery nor fun and games, but an activity requiring 
knowledge and logic. Therefore, operating on financial markets successfully required 
specific skills, and knowledge as well as an appropriate attitude: vigilance, activeness, as 
well as cool and collected rationality (Preda 2001). 
By presenting investing as a cognitive activity requiring rationality and rigorous, al-
most scientific analysis, engaging in financial markets no longer appeared immoral or 
                                                 
8 Investing in those days had to be done physically at the bourse or financial marketplace.  
9 I.e. how to buy and sell securities at the bourse in practice. 
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emotion-based like gambling. It became a matter of the right skills and mindset, and of 
intelligence; yet, importantly, these skills and mindset were presented as something any-
one can learn. Moreover, financial markets were described as entities with specific laws 
of their own: securities’ prices are determined by the value of the company as well as by 
supply and demand. One did not have to guess, what the correct prices were, as they could 
be calculated, stripping financial markets of mystery and rendering them something con-
trollable with simple logic and knowledge. This fit well with the positivistic world-view 
of the time.   
According to Preda (2001), to make investing not only socially acceptable but desira-
ble, the stock exchange was described as a place to fulfill one’s desires and make dreams 
(such as a better house or higher social status) come true. Moreover, the economic nature 
of investing was stressed: engaging in stock market was not a game for pleasure but an 
economic activity, a trade. Also the investor’s responsibility for his investments, for the 
well-being of the company he has invested in, was stressed. Thus, investors were not 
immoral gamblers but in fact honorable merchants. Taking care of one’s investments was 
the same as taking care of one’s family (Preda 2001). Investing became thus business like 
any other, and even an obligation for every respectable man.  
According to Preda (2001), to counter the idea of financial markets as the enemy of 
the state, it was argued that, as the value of assets could increase or decrease on the finan-
cial markets, the markets have a direct influence on the nation’s wealth, thus potentially 
promoting the common wealth. Moreover, instead of being socially disruptive (by allow-
ing social classes to mix), financial markets and investing actually promoted social har-
mony and solidarity in the nation by harmonizing the interests of workers and capitalists, 
i.e. investors. One could even contribute to promoting peace and prosperity by not buying 
bond of states known to be in conflict with other states and, by buying first and foremost 
national stocks and bonds, citizens could contribute to national well-being (Preda 2001). 
Thus investing was not only taking care of one’s own well-being and that of one’s family, 
but also a way to be patriotic and do good on the societal level. 
In summary, this new representation was very different from the previously prevailing 
one, i.e. that of casinos and immoral gamblers. The change in representation made engag-
ing in investing appear no longer socially condemnable but in fact a legitimized, socially 
acceptable activity, a respectable business like any other. Not only that, investing was 
presented as desirable, even a social and individual responsibility of every patriotic, moral 
and smart man10 wanting to do right by himself and his family. 
Importantly, although the view of investing as a business or even near-scientific activ-
ity became dominant, it did not completely replace the older view of markets as a “casino” 
                                                 
10 The investment literature in 1840s distinguished two clear gender roles: men invest (even their wife’s 
money), while women provide them with moral support and restrain them from making bad investments 
(Preda 2001). 
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and investing as gambling. However, the latter representation is most commonly present 
in the works of fiction such as movies and novels, making this alternative view seem a 
marginal one that requires disbelief (Preda 2001). 
Interestingly, Sjöberg’s (2004) examination of finance discourses in American media 
of the late 1990s and early 2000s provides us with three different representations of fi-
nance professionals of Wall Street which in many ways neatly correspond with those 
representations of investing described in Preda’s (2001) study. According to Sjöberg 
(2004), the popular finance discourses in American media portray Wall Street finance 
professionals as either (1) experts and authority figures bearing information hidden to 
“ordinary” people, (2) selfish, aggressive bastards living the life of luxury, or (3) humble, 
hardworking and decent self-made men living the American dream.  
As Sjöberg (2004) describes, overall finance and the activities of financial markets are 
nowadays allowed considerable coverage in the American media, particularly broadcast 
news and talk shows, and this space and time given has expanded significantly over time. 
Further, this development is not questioned in any way, implying a shared understanding 
that this is the way things are “supposed to be”. Economic activities are considered im-
portant, and “moneymaking activities” are held in high regard. This has allowed finance 
professionals to become powerful and influential public figures, individually and as a 
group (Sjöberg 2004). 
Particularly in broadcast news and talk shows finance professionals are portrayed as 
experts and authority figures: a sharply dressed, eloquent, confident man (rarely a 
woman) delivers his interpretation and understandings of the financial market in a mon-
ologue and answers the reporter’s or host’s questions which are most often aimed at sim-
plifying and clarifying rather than questioning the expressed views. This portrayal invites 
watchers to listen and learn from the expert, and establishes the view of finance profes-
sionals as authorities and trusted bearers of important information (Sjöberg 2004). 
This representation is further strengthened by the idea of Wall Street finance profes-
sionals as belonging to an exclusive club, a frequent theme in both Sjöberg’s media anal-
ysis and interviews. By making Wall Street closed and excluded from the public, the 
professionals working there seem to belong to an exclusive club and to have access to 
information hidden to “ordinary” people (Sjöberg 2004). 
The second representation, prevailing in what Sjöberg (2004) calls “war books”, which 
often claim to reveal the “truth” about working on Wall Street and are authored by former 
finance professionals, portrays Wall Street finance professionals as not particularly smart, 
but selfish, money-loving, greedy, arrogant, competitive, calculative and manipulative 
workaholics and describes Wall Street as a destructive environment, where immoral and 
self-degrading acts such as “ass kissing” and (semi)criminal acts are essential and una-
voidable. The ones not performing these kinds of acts are called “morons”, “geeks” or 
“nerds”, implying their inferiority and the fact that they do not “belong” on Wall Street. 
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Within this discourse morality and loyalty are unknown or ridiculed concepts and the 
mindset is every man for himself. Thus, the critical skill for finance professionals within 
this representation is first and foremost being able to “bring a deal home” (Sjöberg 2004). 
The third representation prevails in what Sjöberg (2004) calls the “American dream 
books”, where finance professionals are portrayed as role models: humble, hardworking, 
kind and generous self-made men, who owe everything to Wall Street and the US demo-
cratic system that “allow anyone to come into wealth”. The power the professionals have 
over the economy is viewed as a responsibility delegated to them by clients and the public 
at large, and any immoral (e.g. opportunistic) behavior is effectively explained away by 
placing it in its historical context and stressing the importance of and need for restricted 
markets in present day world. Within this discourse being successful as a finance profes-
sional and belonging on Wall Street requires being an eager team player and willing to 
work hard as well as having an open, quick and creative mind (Sjöberg 2004). 
The comparison of the representations described in Preda’s (2001) and Sjöberg’s 
(2004) studies reveals that they are in many ways similar. In both studies there are roughly 
three ways to perceive investing: (1) as an immoral or at least irresponsible and thus so-
cially undesirable activity, (2) as a respectable, moral and thus socially desirable activity, 
and (3) as a strictly cognitive activity the wider societal effects of which are not discussed. 
Hirsto’s (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011) studies that examine the finance discourse(s) in 
Finnish news media and banks’ marketing texts of 2004 and 2006 describe four different 
representations of investing, all of which, however, ascribe investors a narrow and dis-
empowered position in relation to the financial markets and do not encourage to consider 
the wider societal effects of investing activities, portraying investing as a socially unprob-
lematic, individualistic wealth management or profit-seeking activity (Hirsto 2011). 
In what Hirsto (2007, 2009, 2011) calls the discourse of market mechanics, the focus 
is on the movement on stock prices: business and economic news are presented as the 
causes of price changes and economic events are treated in a simplistic manner as “inputs 
to the market mechanism”. The stock market is rendered measurable, calculable and man-
ageable (Hirsto 2011), and referred to in mechanistic terms and physical metaphors 
(Hirsto 2009). Investors and financial intermediaries are discursively excluded, referring 
to them in collective terms such as “the market”, as if the price changes happened auto-
matically, as a result of forces akin to those of nature. Thus, investors are represented as 
a homogeneous mass or a faceless herd with a uniform course of action, following the 
same rules and laws of the market. Within this discourse, rising prices and active, contin-
uous trading are valued positively, thus encouraging actively following the economy and 
making rapid investment decisions based on mechanistic calculation. The resulting sub-
ject position for the investor is thus that of the neoclassical finance theories: an active 
wealth maximizing daily trader (Hirsto 2011). 
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In what Hirsto (2011) calls the discourse of market psychology the focus is on investor 
sentiment and investing is represented as an engaging, exciting and emotionally laden 
activity: market events and price changes are articulated in terms of investors’ feelings 
(of e.g. joy, fear, surprise, discontent or apathy) and stock market is portrayed as a site of 
excitement and emotional experiences. Interestingly, investors’ feelings are not repre-
sented as “irrational”, but instead legitimized by referring to economic news: rising prices 
and large trading volumes are associated with positive feelings while falling prices and 
low trading volumes are associated with negative sentiment. Frequent comments on the 
expectedness and unexpectedness of events constructs market as not fully predictable but 
also implies that there is a “right” way in which the market should react and function 
(Hirsto 2011). 
In what Hirsto (2007, 2011) calls the discourse of market participation the focus is on 
the management of surplus money. Financial markets are portrayed in a simplistic and 
opaque manner as a sort of “natural resource” to be utilized, and investing is represented 
in positive terms as a normal everyday activity appropriate for everyone. Fund investing 
in particular is portrayed as a smart and desirable thing to do, and its convenience is em-
phasized by contrasting it with the “challenges” of making direct investments. The dis-
course draws heavily on the idea of “the risk of prudency”, i.e. of not taking “appropriate” 
financial risks and thus missing out on profits and losing in comparison to others. All in 
all, the discourse thus turns investment opportunities into duties: investing (as “the right 
way” of managing personal finances) becomes a moral obligation of any responsible and 
reasonable person (Hirsto 2009, 2011). Importantly, pursuing profit is not represented as 
means to a more concrete end, i.e. saving up for something, but as something to be done 
self-evidently; investing and optimizing the profit-risk ratio is portrayed as having intrin-
sic value (Hirsto 2007, 2009). Therefore, the discourse also legitimizes the decision to 
invest even if the investments turned out to be unprofitable: the mere decision to invest 
and take up the subject position of an investor is constructed as the smart and “right” 
course of action (Hirsto 2009).   
In what Hirsto (2011) calls the discourse of market expertise the focus is on analyzing 
and mastering the market. Financial markets are portrayed as a challenging terrain which 
is difficult for ordinary people to safely enter and navigate, and investing is represented 
as a laborious activity requiring hard work, expert knowledge and specialized skills, i.e. 
a job for professionals (Hirsto 2009, 2011). Within this discourse there are thus two sub-
ject positions for investors: professional investors are represented as active, capable ex-
perts who can provide the passive, helpless and disinterested lay investors with an easy 
and safe participation in the financial markets (Hirsto 2011).  
While the representations described in Preda’s (2001) and Sjöberg’s (2004) studies 
correspond with each other very clearly, as described above, the similarity between the 
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representations described in Hirsto’s (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011) studies and those de-
scribed in Preda’s (2001) and Sjöberg’s (2004) studies is not quite as striking. Yet, the 
representations do share some core features and can be seen to parallel one another as 
described in the following. Hirsto’s (2007, 2009, 2011) discourse of market mechanisms 
corresponds with the representation of market as a complex system of unchangeable laws 
and mechanisms described in Preda’s (2001) study and can overlap with the discourse of 
market expertise (Hirsto 2011) which corresponds with the representation of finance pro-
fessionals as authority figures and experts described in Sjöberg’s (2004) study. Also 
Hirsto’s (2011) discourse of market psychology draws partially upon the neoclassical 
representation of market as a system of unchangeable laws and mechanisms but, by por-
traying investing as an emotional activity, also shares this feature with the representation 
of the financial market as a casino (Preda 2001), i.e. a place of sentiment and (at least 
some) non-rationality. Lastly, Hirsto’s (2007, 2011) discourse of market participation 
corresponds with the representation of investing as a respectable trade and even a moral 
obligation of responsible and moral men described in Preda’s (2001) study.  
As mentioned, Fuchs and Graf (2010) examine the construction and framing of the 
financial crisis of 2008 in the German public discourse, and they identify four major met-
aphor groups which could be thought of as discourses or representations: (1) weather and 
environment, (2) illness, (3) fighting, and (4) gambling and fashion. Additionally, Fuchs 
and Graf (2010) also note the frequent references to (5) monarchic system. 
The first two metaphor groups can be seen to parallel the representation of financial 
markets as a world of laws and mechanisms similar to the laws of nature. Firstly, as 
weather and other natural phenomena, including natural disasters, are not only naturally 
occurring but also outside of human control (Fuchs & Graf 2010), this representation 
portrays financial crises as destructive and unavoidable and financial markets as complex 
systems with steady, unchangeable laws and mechanisms which can be discovered (cf. 
the representations in Preda 2001, Sjöberg 2004 and Hirsto 2007, 2009, 2011). Secondly, 
as the weather and forces of nature are uncontrollable, the representation also strips fi-
nancial actors of all power and responsibility to influence the events (Fuchs and Graf 
2010): the best (and also the responsible thing) anyone can do is study the laws of this 
world, try to forecast any major disasters and try to “weather out” the storms. Further, 
weather might appear non-calculable and unpredictable and even caused by a “higher 
power” (Fuchs and Graf 2010), especially for laypeople, which strengthens the finance 
professionals’ roles as the authorities and experts on financial markets and investing. Ad-
ditionally, as weather and forces of nature are uncontrollable and outside human control, 
there is no reason to suggest political changes. 
The second metaphor group portrays banks as “organs” pumping money, “blood”, to 
the different parts of the society, allowing it to function and flourish. This representation 
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still draws on the naturalistic idea of financial markets as having discoverable and un-
changeable laws and mechanisms similar to the laws of nature, but also portrays investing 
and financial markets as vital to the society. Further, drawing on the idea that if an organ-
ism becomes ill, it will need to be treated or the illness will get worse, potentially threat-
ening even the survival of the organism, this discourse can be seen to legitimize any 
means necessary to fight any “illnesses” or problems, such as financial crises (Fuchs & 
Graf 2010). In contrast to the first metaphor group, unlike weather and natural disasters, 
illnesses can be both unfortunately contracted or caused by unhealthy habits, thus allow-
ing for the discussion of the ir/responsibility or the lack of it of financial actors for their 
actions (Fuchs & Graf 2010). Thus, as far as political implications are considered, the 
representation allows discussing the regulation of financial activities (i.e. are financial 
actors responsible for the “illness” and if so, how it can be prevented in the future), but 
does not encourage to challenge the whole system as the society is seen as highly depend-
ent or even inseparable from the financial markets and the markets are seen in a natural-
istic light. 
Fuchs & Graf (2010) describe the third and fourth metaphor groups as small and there-
fore discuss them only briefly. According to them, the third metaphor group, “fighting”, 
highlights the severity and unpredictability of the financial crisis and allows the attribu-
tion of the roles of attacker/executioner and victims. This metaphor group, however, does 
not really describe investing or financial markets and is not therefore meaningful to this 
study. The fourth metaphor group, “gambling and fashion”, on the other hand, quite 
clearly parallels the representation of financial markets as a casino (Preda 2001), portray-
ing investing as lighthearted dealing with (somebody else’s) money and investors as spec-
ulators willing to accept high levels of risk. Further, as fashion is constantly changing, 
the representation also portrays investing as hopping from one trend to next rather than 
having stable, reliable criteria for decisions (Fuchs & Graf 2010). This representation 
shows financial actors and investing in an unfavorable light and holds individual financial 
actors responsible for their actions. This allows questioning even the necessity and mo-
rality of investing and financial markets, in general. 
Lastly, according to Fuchs and Graf (2010), references to monarchic system portrays 
banking-praxis as random and autocratic as well as financial actors as being above the 
common people, laws and the democratic system. Clearly, this parallels both the repre-
sentation of finance professionals as authorities and experts (cf. the representations in 
Sjöberg 2004 and Hirsto 2011) and the representation of finance professionals being 
power-hungry and selfish (cf. the representation in Sjöberg 2004).  
Fuchs and Graf (2010) also note the disproportionately high frequency of mentions of 
Josef Ackermann, a Swiss banker and former CEO of Deutsche Bank, and argue that in 
him all normative issues seem to materialize: “Ackermann is simultaneously the – not 
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loved, but secretly envied, if not admired – powerful and successful or at least indispen-
sable individual, and the ultimate bad guy.” This exemplifies the contradictory nature of 
representations of finance professionals: they are simultaneously regarded as admired role 
models, indispensable experts, and hated, immoral villains. This finding fits together per-
fectly with the ones of Sjöberg (2004). 
As their conclusion, Fuch & Graf (2010) argue that a coherent and definite construc-
tion of the crisis cannot be found. They speculate the heterogeneity in presentation might 
be a consequence of the number of different authors, but also due to the size and com-
plexity of the financial crisis as well as the surprising nature of developments. However, 
when the findings of Fuchs & Graf (2010) are compared to the representations described 
in the studies of Preda (2001), Sjöberg (2004) and Hirsto (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011), the 
heterogeneity does not seem surprising at all: as described in paragraphs above, the very 
same, conflicting representations can be found in all studies. 
Indeed, all in all, it is easy to see there is quite a lot of overlap in the representations 
described in Preda’s (2001), Sjöberg’s (2004), Hirsto’s (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011) and 
Fuchs & Graf’s (2010) studies. Table 1 summarizes the core features of each representa-
tion described in more detail above.  
Analyzing the representations, there appears to be overall six relevant dimensions to 
draw on and evoke when constructing different representations of investing. Firstly, in-
vesting can be constructed as socially disruptive and destructive (representations A, D, M 
and N), socially desirable or even vital (representations B, E, I and L) or individualistic 
and thus socially unproblematic (representations C, F, G and K). Secondly, investing can 
be constructed as immoral (representations A, D, M and N), moral (representations B, E 
and I), something in between (representations J and L) or detached from moral consider-
ations (representations C, F, G and K). Thirdly, investing can be constructed as irrespon-
sible (representations A and M), responsible (representations B, E and I), something in 
between (representations J and L) or detached from such considerations (representations 
C, F, G and K). Fourthly, investing can be constructed as being of intrinsic value (repre-
sentations C, F, G and I) or of instrumental value (representations A, B, D, E, M and N), 
and fifthly, as emotional (representations A and M), rational (representations C, D, E, F, 
G, I, J, K and L) or something in between (representations B, H and N). Lastly, investing 
can be constructed as being possible for only the elite such as professionals or the rich 
(representations F, J and N) or for anyone (representations B, E and I).  
As can be seen, not all of the dimensions or aspects are equally present in each repre-
sentation and the dimensions are also not completely separate from one another. For ex-
ample, immoral activities are usually regarded also as socially disruptive. Further, irre-
sponsibility such as gambling often implies some level of immorality, but immorality is 




Table 1 A summary of the representations of financial markets, investing and in-





Financial market Investing Investors 
Preda 
(2001) 
A A casino 





Market place like any 
other  
A respectable trade;  
taking care of one’s 
family; a moral obliga-
tion; fulfilling one’s 
dreams of better life 
Smart, responsible and 
patriotic men  
C 
A world of economic 
laws and mechanisms 
A rational activity  
requiring specialized 








and self-degrading acts 
are unavoidable 
A game where naïve  







A democratic institution, 
that allows anyone to 
come into wealth 
An activity requiring an 
open, quick, creative 
mind and hard work 
Professionals: humble, 
hardworking, kind and 
generous self-made men 
F 
A world of economic 
laws and mechanisms 
An important activity of 
intrinsic value, requiring 













ble and manageable 
world of economic laws 
and mechanisms 
A wealth-maximizing  
activity that requires  
constant vigilance  
A homogeneous mass of 
active, wealth maximiz-
ing daily traders 
H 
A site of excitement and 
emotional experiences 
An engaging, emotion-
ally laden activity 
Sentimental, yet also  
rational people 
I 
A natural resource to be 
utilized 
A normal, desirable  
everyday activity appro-
priate for everyone; 
A moral obligation hav-
ing intrinsic value 
Smart, responsible  
individuals  
J 
A challenging terrain 
difficult for ordinary 
people to safely enter 
and navigate 
A laborious activity  
requiring hard work,  
expert knowledge and 
specialized skills 
Professionals: active,  
capable experts  
Non-professionals:  






A complex system of 
steady, unchangeable,  





Investors: powerless  
actors at the mercy of 





A complex system of 
steady, unchangeable,  




Societally vital people 
who can potentially (to 
an extent) held responsi-
ble for their actions 
M 






Realm for the (financial) 
elite 
Whims and wanton de-
sires of the elite 
Power-hungry, selfish  
autocrats above the  
common people, laws 




The overlapping representations can be combined to form a simpler, more comprehen-
sive mapping of the different perspectives on financial activities, and the resulting 
“weave” of representations, including which of them can coexist and which conflict with 
one another, is depicted in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 A tentative map of social representations of investing based on the earlier 
research literature 
Figure 1 also depicts five of the six dimensions described above: the blue area repre-
sents the representations portraying investing as being detached from social and moral 
considerations while the red-yellow-green area represents the representations portraying 
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investing as either socially disruptive, immoral and/or irresponsible (red), or socially de-
sirable, moral and/or responsible (green) or something in between (yellow). Further, the 
representations in the bottom part of the figure portray investing as an emotional activity 
while the representations in the top part portray investing as a rational activity. Similarly, 
the representations in the bottom part of the figure portray investing as being of instru-
mental value while the representations in the top part portray investing as being of intrin-
sic value.  
Moving on to describe the representations depicted in figure 1, first, combining the 
shared elements of the representations C, F, G, K and L in table 1 results in the (neoclas-
sical finance’s) representation of markets as a complex, yet measurable, calculable and 
manageable world of steady, unchangeable and discoverable economic laws and mecha-
nisms. Due to this naturalistic appearance of markets and financial activities, considera-
tions of morality are not meaningful within this representation: just like natural phenom-
ena such as wind or rain are considered neither “moral” nor “immoral” (instead they just 
are), financial markets and activities are also perceived to be detached from the questions 
of im/morality (as depicted by the blue color in figure 1). Within this representation, in-
vesting is a rational, individualistic and socially unproblematic wealth-maximizing activ-
ity that is of intrinsic value and requires specialized knowledge and skills as well as con-
stant vigilance. The available subject position for investors is that of a homogeneous mass 
of (hyper)rational calculators and active daily traders as well as powerless actors at the 
mercy of (naturalistic) market forces. 
This first representation can and often does coexist with the representation of markets 
as a dangerous environment, i.e. representation J in table 1. Within the latter, financial 
markets are depicted as so complex and difficult that they are impossible for non-experts 
to safely navigate, i.e. non-experts have no business entering the financial markets on 
their own as investing is strictly a job for professionals. Thus, for non-professional inves-
tors the only available subject position is that of a passive, helpless and disinterested, and 
the only way to invest is with the help of finance professionals. Further, this representa-
tion is situated in both the realm of moral considerations and outside of it (as depicted in 
figure 1 by the representation lying across the border of the red-yellow-green area and the 
blue area) because while investing as an activity is perceived to be individualistic and 
socially unproblematic, it is considered, as said, a job for experts, implying it to be dumb 
or irresponsible and thus immoral for non-experts to engage in it. Lastly, investing is 
perceived to be mostly a rational, not emotional activity, as implied by the emphasis on 
complex mechanisms and laws of market and the necessary cognitive requirements to 
navigate them. 
The third representation is that of financial markets as a fair market place or even a 
democratic institution offering an equal chance of success and becoming wealthy to all 
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(representations B and E in table 1). Within this representation investing appears in fa-
vorable light: it is a respectable trade like any other or a smart, responsible way to manage 
one’s finances and, by doing so, taking care of one’s family. Thus, within this represen-
tation, investors are respectable merchants and self-made, moral and responsible people. 
Further, as a democratic institution offering an equal chance to better one’s life, financial 
markets and investing also appear as a socially harmonizing and thus desirable institution. 
The morality, responsibility and social desirability aspect of the third representation is 
depicted by the green color in figure 1. 
The third representation can coexist with the first or the second one or even with both 
of them simultaneously. Combining the second and the third representations results in a 
portrayal of investing as a respectable activity which, however, is only possible for the 
knowledgeable experts who know how to navigate the complex financial markets. Within 
this view the markets are not quite as democratic an institution as in the third representa-
tion because it is not possible for just anyone to freely benefit from them, but they are 
regardless democratic as they are fair (in the same sense as nature is fair), offering all 
professionals an equal chance of success, and for lay investors it is possible to enter the 
markets with help from professionals. 
Combining the first and the third representation results in more interesting implica-
tions. Portraying financial markets in a naturalistic light as an inexhaustible resource to 
be utilized (representation I in table 1) and investing as a respectable, moral way to take 
care of one’s finances and thus one’s family, investing no longer appears as a mere op-
portunity but as a moral obligation for people: within this representation, to invest is to 
be smart and responsible and to not invest is to be dumb and/or irresponsible. Further, as 
financial markets are portrayed as an inexhaustible resource, investing appears as de-
tached from wider societal (moral) considerations and thus socially unproblematic. 
Therefore, within this representation, on the individual level investing is a moral obliga-
tion, but on the wider societal level it is detached from the considerations of morality (as 
depicted in figure 1 by the representation being situated in both the green and the blue 
area).  
By combining the first, the second and the third representation, the situation changes 
again: within this combination, all people have a moral obligation to participate in the 
financial markets (as described in the paragraph above), but as financial markets are a 
dangerous environment for non-experts, the smart or the only possible course of action is 
to pay for the services of finance professionals. 
The fourth representation in figure 1 corresponds to representations A and M in table 
1 and portrays financial markets as a sort of casino where thrill- and pleasure-seeking 
speculators engage in irresponsible, lighthearted gambling, taking enormous risks in 
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hopes of quick, large profits. Within this representation investing thus appears in unfa-
vorable light as a morally questionable and potentially socially disruptive activity (as de-
picted by the red color in figure 1) full of emotion and excitement. This fourth represen-
tation shares one interesting aspect with the third representation: the idea of investing as 
a way to fulfill one’s dreams of a better, richer rife. Thus, within both these representa-
tions, investing is of instrumental value: it is not considered self-evident (as in the first 
and sometimes the second representation) but is valued because it enables something else, 
usually increasing one’s social status and well-being.  
The fourth representation’s aspect of investing as an emotionally laden, engaging and 
exciting activity can also overlap with the first representation of markets as a complex 
system of steady, unchangeable and discoverable economic laws and mechanisms. Such 
a combination (which corresponds with representation H in table 1) results in a represen-
tation familiar from behavioral finance: the market is a system of unchangeable, measur-
able and discoverable laws and there is a “right” and “rational” way for investors to be-
have and react to economic events, but people as sentimental creatures do not always 
behave rationally which results in some unpredictability and chaos in the market. 
Lastly, corresponding with representation D in table 1, there is the fifth representation 
of markets as a destructive, socially disruptive environment where irresponsible, (semi-
)criminal, immoral acts are unavoidable; naturally, investing thus appears in unfavorable 
light as an irresponsible, selfish, and/or immoral activity, as depicted by the red color in 
figure 1. Within this representation, investors, particularly professional ones, are often 
perceived to be the rich elite who behave as if they are above the common people, law 
and the democratic system. This representation can and often does coexist with the second 
representation, i.e. the one where markets are regarded as a complex, dangerous environ-
ment and investing as a job for professionals; in this combination, finance professionals 
are regarded as the immoral, powerful and rich elite who engage in the “investing game” 
where naïve clients are used for professionals’ selfish gains. This fifth representation can 
also share the aspect of investing as an emotional, engaging activity with the fourth rep-
resentation, in which case investing appears as an activity of fulfilling selfish whims and 
wanton desires of the rich, powerful elite of (professional) investors, a view which corre-
sponds with representation N in table 1. 
Summarizing chapter 2.3, the following conclusions can be made. First, it is clear that 
there are multiple alternative representations of investing, investors and financial markets 
offering vastly different and sometimes conflicting subject positions and behavioral 
guidelines. However, while some of the representations are conflicting, some are also 
complementary and/or can overlap, creating a complex system of competing perspectives. 
Lastly, notably, as the studies of Preda (2001), Sjöberg (2004), Hirsto (2007, 2009, 2010, 
2011) and Fuchs & Graf (2010) all utilize data from a different time and geographical 
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location and still describe similar alternative portrayals of financial phenomena, the rep-
resentations seem to be relatively persistent over time, and span across geographical space 
and different national cultures, at least within the western countries of the last century or 
so. This implies that, indeed, there are some kind of social representations of investing, 
investors and financial markets and people draw on the same, culturally and socially 
shared discursive resources time and again when making sense of and communicating 
about financial phenomena. 
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3 METHODS AND DATA 
The empirical data of the study consists of eight interviews among Finnish private bank-
ing professionals employed by six different employers. The interviewees are private 
bankers and asset managers, all of whom work directly with clients, discussing the cli-
ents’ investment needs and goals and finding suitable investment opportunities for them. 
As they work directly on the boundary between professional and non-professional invest-
ing, they face and need to manage the possible tensions resulting from the potentially 
different social representations among professional and nonprofessional investors. As 
mentioned, their potential need to negotiate a shared understanding with clients creates a 
fruitful opportunity for investigating the social and cultural construction of investing ac-
tivities.  
Five of the interviewees have lengthy (15–30 years) experience working in investing-
related positions and three of them have only less than or approximately a decade of in-
vestment-related work experience. Five of the interviewees are employed by traditional 
banks and three by smaller investment firms. Seven of the interviewees work in Turku 
and one works in Pori. Six of the interviewees are male and two are female. 
The interviews were 50–100 minutes long, semi-structured, based initially on the 
themes found in earlier research literature on representations of investing, investors and 
financial markets, and conversational in tone. Refer to Appendix 1 for the interview 
guide. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the data collection method to keep the 
conversation focused on the subject and create somewhat systematic and comprehensive 
data while 1) allowing for the interviewees’ own subjective perceptions of what is im-
portant and meaningful to discuss, thus giving room for potential unexpected themes 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008), and 2) minimizing the danger of asking leading questions, 
thus determining the nature of the results. 
The analysis of the data was abductive in nature. While deductive research can be 
described as moving from theory to empirics by making hypotheses and then testing them 
using empirical data and inductive research as moving from empirical findings to theory 
by analyzing the data without theoretical propositions, abductive research can be de-
scribed as combining deduction and induction by moving iteratively between the empiri-
cal data and the theoretical models and concepts (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). In other 
words, abductive research combines data-driven analysis with using theory and prior re-
search as an interpretative lens: the empirical findings arise from the data as in inductive 
research, but the analysis is not void of external influence but instead assisted by theory 
and earlier research which provide concepts and models to help make sense of and struc-
ture the data. Further, the analysis was also comparative, and it was done simultaneously 
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to data collection. This made it possible to identify unexpected themes arising in inter-
views early on and explore them further in later interviews, ensuring a comprehensive 
understanding of the topic. 
All in all, the goal of the analysis was to identify frequently occurring patterns and 
themes as well as often used discursive resources in the accounts of the interviewees. 
Thus, instead of being a simple content analysis focusing on what the interviewees say, 
the analysis was also informed by the methods used in discourse analysis: the focus was 
not only on what is said, but also on what is not said as well as how interviewees talk 
about and describe things, reason and justify their opinion. It should be noted that dis-
course analysis is not a single method but more of an analytical framework which encom-
passes several different approaches, such as Foucauldian discourse analysis, social psy-
chological discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis. This study uses social psy-
chological discourse analysis which is mostly concerned with how events and objects 
(e.g. identities as versions of self) are constructed as factual and real (cf. SRT and DP) as, 
in the spirit of social constructionism, there are thought to be multiple alternative ways of 
perceiving them available in the world (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). 
In practice, the analysis was done as follows. First seven of the interviews were rec-
orded and transcribed; one interviewee did not allow recording and thus only detailed 
notes were made from that interview. Both verbal content and non-verbal content (e.g. 
laughter, sighing, humming, tone of voice, physical gestures, etc.) were transcribed, and 
pauses were marked. False starts and repetitions of words, such as the interviewee chang-
ing a course of the sentence or stuttering, were included as they potentially convey infor-
mation, e.g. indicating change of mind, uncertainty, uneasiness or surprise. 
Second, the transcribed interviews were first carefully read twice and then coded. By 
comparing the interviews to one another, common themes and repeating patterns (e.g. the 
use of the same discursive resources) could be identified. From codes and repeating pat-
terns broader themes were constructed. At this stage, some of the themes were also either 
omitted or combined with others to ensure each one has sufficient support from data and 
contributed to answering the research questions. As mentioned, the analysis was done in 
an abductive manner, i.e. coding, the construction of broader themes and making sense 
of them was informed by the earlier research on representations and discourses of invest-
ing, investors and financial market. Yet, the earlier research was not used in a restrictive 
or deterministic manner, but instead only when meaningful for understanding the data. 
Further, as mentioned, the process was iterative: after one round of analysis, another one 
was done, and so on until a saturation point was reached.  
Importantly, it should be noted that as this study assumes the reality is socially con-
structed, the study is interpretive, meaning the analysis and the results of this study are 
the researcher’s interpretation of the data, i.e. simply one possible way of making sense 
39 
 
of it. Thus, the study does not produce (statistically) generalizable results, but rather in-
troduces new perspectives and starts building a knowledge base onto which further re-
search will be possible.  
This, however, renders the typical measures of research quality – validity, referring to 
the extent results are “true” (i.e. are an accurate description of the phenomenon studied), 
and reliability, referring to the repeatability of findings – impossible to use as usually; 
they must either be adapted or replaced with other measures (Eriksson & Kovalainen 
2008). For example, Lincoln and Guba (1985) substitute validity and reliability with the 
concept of trustworthiness consisting of credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability as measures of research quality. Credibility refers to confidence in the 
“truth” of results and conclusions: whether the data is sufficient to merit the claims, 
whether the claims are linked to observations, and whether others could, on the basis of 
the materials, agree with the claims. Transferability refers to connecting the study to ear-
lier research and showing that the results have some applicability in other contexts. Con-
firmability refers to the results of the study being shaped by the data and not just a frag-
ment of researcher’s imagination. Lastly, dependability refers to showing that the re-
search process has been logical, traceable and documented, ensuring that the findings are 
consistent and could be repeated.  
Drawing on Lincoln and Guba (1985), several measures were taken to ensure trust-
worthiness and high quality of research in this study. To ensure the credibility of the 
study, data collection and analysis were continued until a saturation point was reached 
(i.e. no new information could be obtained) and findings and interpretations were care-
fully linked to data (e.g. exemplifying quotes from interviews were provided) and thick 
(i.e. detailed, profound) description was used. Further, member-checking was used: the 
interviewees were given a chance to read through and comment on the thesis draft, and 
they made no indication of disagreeing with the results or the interpretation of their ac-
counts. Careful linking of findings and interpretations to data, thick description and mem-
ber-checking also serve to ensure confirmability of the study. To ensure transferability of 
the results, findings and interpretations have been carefully compared to and linked with 
earlier research literature, both in the analysis stage (as described above) and in discussing 
the results (in chapter five). Lastly, to ensure dependability of the study, methodology, 




4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Over all, there is simultaneously somewhat surprising diversity but also uniformity across 
the interviewed private banking professionals. Firstly, the title of a person does not nec-
essarily reveal much about their actual job: most private bankers, for example, do not 
analyze markets themselves but instead base their advice to clients on the company’s 
analysts’ recommendations. Yet some private bankers do scan the markets for investment 
opportunities themselves, similar to what two of the three interviewed asset managers do. 
However, not all asset managers scan markets; there are some, whose job is actually 
closer to what private bankers generally do, i.e. choosing which investment products out 
of the company’s recommended ones are suitable to their clients’ particular needs. There-
fore, although the core tasks remain the same for all interviewees, there is slight diversity 
in the tasks of private banking professionals and the tasks are not necessarily strictly re-
lated to their title. 
The perceptions of those private banking professionals, who do scan markets for in-
vestment opportunities themselves, do differ a little from the perceptions of those profes-
sionals, who base their advice on the analysts’ recommendations; the best way to describe 
this slight difference is that the former tend to talk about investing in a more technical 
way, going more into details and using more professional terminology, while the latter 
tend to be more “people-oriented”, talk about investing in standard language terms and 
avoid going into details too much. 
Secondly, there is diversity in the interviewees’ educational backgrounds: some have 
a Master’s degree, some a Bachelor’s degree, some no academic degree at all. Further, 
not all have degrees in accounting and finance, or even business-related studies. However, 
most had studied at least some finance before entering the private banking sector, and 
most mentioned that employers also offer useful and necessary training. Interestingly, 
there is quite a strong consensus among interviewees that the best way to learn the nec-
essary skills is by actually working; experience was perceived to be very important and 
many interviewees feel academic studies alone do not prepare one adequately to work in 
private banking and be successful.  
Despite this diversity of job tasks and educational backgrounds, there is strong ideo-
logical uniformity across the interviewees: all professionals perceive both investing and 
working in private banking quite similarly. For example, their perceptions about goals of 
investing, the competitiveness of the field, and morality and ethics in private banking are 
very similar, as well as their rather strongly individualistic ideology. Their gender, edu-
cational background, the length of work experience in the field, or the type of their em-
ployer did not appear to cause any noticeable differences in perceptions. 
41 
 
Overall, as described in more detail in the following subchapters, the identity of private 
banking professionals is far from simplistic or clear-cut; on the contrary, they need to 
play simultaneously many different roles, the demands of which may at times be conflict-
ing, resulting in tensions the private banking professionals must manage and solve in or-
der to successfully do their job. There are also some indications of a spoiled identity, 
which the professionals must manage. As described in chapters 4.4 and 4.5, the main 
strategy for managing the tensions and solving the problem of a spoiled identity is draw-
ing a clear line between the “real, proper” private banking professionals and the “others” 
working in the field. Where that line is, however, differs slightly from one person to an-
other, which implies that despite the rather strong uniformity of opinions and similarity 
of perceptions, there is still room for diversity too. 
4.1 Finance experts interpreting markets 
“In this job, if I can help my clients to get wealthy and be a kind of financial and economic 
interpreter [explaining] what is happening in the world today. Especially, well, in the past 
one read economic news in newspapers, nowadays from the Internet, and the information 
explosion on the Internet, it is just massive, so filtering that information and utilizing it, if I 
can help my clients in that, I have succeeded in my job.” (Asset manager in a bank, 11 years 
of experience) 
 
Finnish private banking professionals identify first and foremost through their expert 
knowledge of investing and financial markets. They strongly emphasize the need to be 
constantly up-to-date on the latest developments, whether it is on the news front, market 
movements or the selection of financial products available to investors. In fact, the strong 
interest in news, financial markets and financial products is the basic requirement for a 
private banking professional; following the developments in these areas is not thought of 
as work, but as something a professional should and will do out of their own personal 
interest: 
 
“The world of investing is a fascinating world. There's always something going on and some-
thing new coming up all the time. - - And I like developing my own knowledge and under-
standing and I feel that on this side [of commercial banking] it's much more challenging to 
keep up, because that world is constantly changing.” (Private banker in an investment firm, 
20 years of experience) 
 
“It would be quite embarrassing, if I didn’t know what’s been on the news. [laughs] I’m 
supposed to know those things. First, when I arrive at work, I open the front page of Kaup-
palehti and whatever stock market pages I need, leave them in the background, and from time 
to time glance what’s happening there, on the level of headlines, and what news have been 




“In fact, my work as a portfolio manager is in big part reading news, monitoring the markets, 
and of course in the morning, when we arrive at work, we check first how the markets in Asia 
have done, has something strange happened, what’s happening on the economic front in 
general and what’s on the news. - - Over the course of the day, can’t say 24/7, got to sleep 
some time too, but it is our job, a portfolio manager’s job, to keep track of news. We have to 
know what’s happening in the world. In practice, we are constantly monitoring that, whether 
we are working or not. And none of us think of it as-, well, it’s not ‘working’, when we monitor 
the news. It is our own personal interest. We like to do it and want to do it.” (Asset manager 
in a bank, 11 years of experience) 
 
Thus, being a private banking professional requires both keeping up with the latest 
developments and innovations in the finance world and constantly monitoring and filter-
ing the information available in the stream of news and movements of markets, staying 
“awake” and vigilant, and being proactive and taking initiative. A professional is knowl-
edgeable about all available investment products and how they can best be utilized in each 
unique situation. Further, a professional is at all times aware of the situation on the mar-
kets and understands how each new piece of information affects the movements on mar-
kets. Yet, working in such a constantly changing, even hectic environment, is generally 
not perceived to be overly stressful: although professionals admit it to be challenging and 
even tiring, they stress that it is also interesting and personally rewarding and that they 
are used to it. Therefore, to be successful in and belong to the world of private banking, 
one needs to have a high tolerance for stress, willingness to work hard and have a strong 
interest in all economic and financial matters. 
Interestingly, however, unlike the knowledge of different investment instruments, the 
essential ability to interpret news correctly is not perceived to be based on finance 
knowledge acquired through studying, but on practical experience of investing and inter-
acting on financial markets. One learns how to “read markets” and, in time, even develops 
an intuitive feeling about them. Importantly, this intuition is not based on emotions or 
groundless feelings; it is the result of seeing the ups and downs of the markets: 
 
“Another thing that only comes with time is a kind of knowledge of markets and a kind of gut 
feeling about them and... You get some kind of stability with experience; that you won’t jump 
at every signal.” (Private banker in a bank, 28 years of experience) 
 
“[What one needs to succeed] is related to how you interpret the markets, kind of try to 
forecast a bit, which is extremely difficult, but…You need to understand how this world goes 
around, how the economy works, which components affect what and then interpreting these 
things.” (Asset manager in a bank, 11 years of experience) 
 
“These younger colleagues, or if you only have a few years of investing experience, they have 
seen only rising markets, and then you maybe see that as just positive and think the market 
just keeps rising. But you need to really understand that the price of the stock should be based 
on the company’s performance and what the future expectations are and how the economy 




Having this kind of intuitive gut feeling is what separates professionals from amateurs: 
through their long experience and “being in touch with the market” professionals are able 
to perceive the “correct” prices of investments and how much the market prices differ 
from those, which allows the professionals to recognize good investment opportunities 
from the bad ones. Further, due to their experience, professionals are able to filter real 
information out of the constant, massive flood of data and interpret it correctly, neither 
reacting too strongly nor too mildly. As the professionals describe above, one will not 
“jump at every signal”, making hasty decisions that result in losses of profits, but also 
will not be seduced by the rising stock prices and become overly optimistic, unknowingly 
taking risks too big. Indeed, what is also perceived to separate true professionals from 
amateurs is the ability to perceive and measure risk correctly and reliably. 
This lengthy experience also gives professionals the perspective needed to control 
one’s emotions and remain rational in times of falling markets and market turbulence. 
Amateurs or those with too little experience lack that perspective and are thus more prone 
to get emotional and make unwise investment decisions: 
 
“Each one of us has many years of experience and the longer the better maybe. A good 
portfolio manager has seen more than one real economic downturn or a depression on the 
market, so they know what it can be. This is, of course, a strange situation in the sense that 
we have come up for so many years now, and people think that it’s nothing, nothing can 
happen. But when it does come, controlling [the emotions] and our role in that is really 
important.” (Asset manager in a bank, 11 years of experience) 
 
“[During the last financial crisis] I had clients who were under terrible pressure. - - Those 
who trusted me, when I said that the situation would surely improve, didn’t realize their 
losses. But those who said, ‘I don’t believe in this, this is the end, I need to get my money out’ 
did realize the losses.” (Private banker in an investment firm, 20 years of experience) 
4.2 Advisors providing solutions and support 
“If I came to work here straight after studying finance, I would be in quite a trouble, because 
there’s so much contact with people and they don’t teach you that at school, you need to 
learn it through working. You won’t get a client’s trust by being able to show how nicely you 
can count some key ratios and blah, blah, blah. To be able to talk with the client, listen to 
them and interpret what they say, that is much more important. Only after gaining their trust 
that way can you begin to talk about investing.” (Private banker in an investment firm, 10 
years of experience) 
 
As the quote above exemplifies, possibly even more important than studying the news 
stream and markets and utilizing the information they provide is the ability to earn the 
client’s trust and discover and understand one’s clients’ needs as without understanding 
the clients’ needs, one cannot provide them with appropriate solutions to their problems. 
The key skills are to respect and listen closely to one’s clients, but also to see beyond 
what they say, to get to their real, possibly unexpressed needs and limits. There needs to 
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be the right chemistry between the professional and the client and, as clients might range 
from young and financially inexperienced lottery winners to busy middle-aged entrepre-
neurs to conservative elderly widow(er)s, to provide all clients with that feeling of genu-
ine chemistry, the professional has to be able to quickly adapt to different situations and 
communication styles. 
 
“You need, of course, people skills and communication skills with clients and to be able to 
understand their psyche.” (Private banker in a bank, 17 years of experience) 
 
“Most important is to get along with people. That is absolutely the number one thing. The 
kind of communication and then maybe understanding others, what they want. I mean really 
want. Many say something else than they actually want in reality.” (Private banker in a bank, 
28 years of experience) 
 
 “This is hard work. You really have to put in effort to get clients. After all, this is purely 
based on trust. You have to be able to build that client’s trust in the product and maybe even 
more in that the personal chemistry works between the client and their wealth manager. It 
will work to some extent, let’s say, if the portfolio and such work but, in the end, who you 
have sitting across you, the personal chemistry, that must match as well.” (Asset manager in 
an investment firm, 8 years of experience) 
 
However, in today’s competitive market, simply being a good people person will not 
do either. One needs to both understand clients and be a finance expert: 
 
“First clients see, of course, whether they feel the professional is a good guy, whether they 
want to associate with them, and after that they will weigh him/her against another and a 
third one they have judged to be a good guy, and then they start to think what the profession-
als really knew of these things and what kind of solutions they have to offer.” (Private banker 
in an investment firm, 10 years of experience) 
 
For private banking professionals keeping up with the developments and helping cli-
ents thus intertwine together. Without one, the other is useless. Both also require constant 
vigilance, being active and taking initiative. To succeed as a private banking professional, 
one needs to know the latest developments on the markets and in the world as well as be 
service-oriented, understanding the client’s needs and limits, even when they go unex-
pressed, and being easily reachable to clients at all times, including evenings, weekends 
and even holidays. Professionals tend to take their responsibility as clients’ financial in-
terpreters and advisors extremely seriously, taking pride in their work and even going 
beyond the call of duty. In many ways then, working in private banking is not just a career, 
it is a way of life: 
 
“Somehow I do think the clients have employed me to take care of their wealth and it doesn’t 
matter whether I have a holiday or not. So, when my holiday begins, I message my clients 
about it and, although the bank’s instructions differ from this, I attach my cellphone number 
along, so they can call me, if they have some urgent questions or something on their mind.” 




“The con in this work is of course that, in a way, we don’t have a working time. Of course, 
officially we have a set number of working hours, but our working time is an entirely benda-
ble concept; the days are usually long. The kind of 7-and-half-an-hour days, they are just 
dreams. Even after turning off the light at the office, your cellphone is always with you. Our 
clients have our numbers. They don’t care at what time they call us. If they have a problem, 
they will call, whether it’s Sunday or Friday or nine o’clock in the evening or in the morning. 
And wherever I go, to a grocery store or to a gym, there’s always someone who’s my client, 
so you have to always consider that in everything you do. In a way you’re always working.” 
(Private banker in an investment firm, 10 years of experience) 
 
A recurring theme in the interviews is the particular quality of the relationship with 
clients: in wealth management the relationships are typically long, as it usually takes a 
long time to gain the client’s trust as well as to truly get to know them well enough to 
provide good advice, and often the relationships also become quite close as clients share 
their private matters with their wealth managers: 
 
“Quite many of the clients, can’t say they become friends, but when we see each other that 
3–4 times a year, we always catch up on what’s new with the family and at times it can get 
quite deep, that relationship with the client. And that of course reflects how well you have 
gained their trust. And then we check, ’Well then, how’s the portfolio’. ‘It’s been like this.’ 
And then we get back to some other matters.” (Asset manager in an investment firm, 8 years 
of experience) 
 
 Indeed, discussing investing is only a small part of the communication with clients; 
often also delicate and emotional issues such as family matters (e.g. marriage, divorce, 
inheritance) and other personal matters such as unemployment and health problems are 
discussed as these all are related to the client’s financial needs. Thus, to provide clients 
with sound financial advice, private banking professionals first need to get quite involved 
in their lives. 
Thus, in the end, private banking professionals are not simply financial advisors, 
providing comprehensive solutions (which take into account taxation, juridical issues, the 
client’s personal moral values and so forth) to the client’s needs, but also confidants of 
sorts, offering emotional support. Firstly, private banking professionals bring stability and 
security to their client’s life by making sure their client’s economic affairs are in such an 
order they will not face any hardship unprepared. Indeed, what the interviewees often 
perceived to separate true professionals from amateurs is the ability to think of investing 
in a strategic and holistic manner, taking all necessary information into account. Profes-
sionals ensure the client will not exceed their risk preference by accident and that all 
investment decisions are made according to their long-term, comprehensive investment 
plan. Secondly, professionals provide their clients with emotional support, particularly 
during any economic “turbulence” or downturns: private banking professionals remind 
their client of the investment plan, restate the reasons behind the investment decisions 




“[The best thing in this work] is probably just that, when the client is genuinely satisfied and 
you can see they are relieved that their affairs are in order and they feel confident and happy 
and then you yourself will feel happy, because you have been able to really help someone.” 
(Private banker in an investment firm, 10 years of experience) 
 
“I do feel a good wealth manager will reassure the client and re-state the reasons [why some 
decisions were made]. ‘This was a match for you then like so’ and so forth. ‘There are just 
some bumps on the road now, but there’s no reason to believe the whole world is crashing 
down’.” (Private banker in an investment firm, 20 years of experience) 
 
 “[The value of private banking] is at least that the client can lash out on us when something 
goes wrong! [laughs] That’s what I always say. ‘I’ll be the face, when something goes wrong, 
you won’t have to look at yourself in the mirror; you can come and say, ‘Damn you [name], 
everything’s all fucked up!’’. I mean really. That is important. Having someone to take it out 
on.” (Asset manager in an investment firm, 8 years of experience) 
4.3 Salesmen selling products 
“You need to be greedy, in a way to, to get the deals. If you’re not at all interested in what’s 
left on the line, then sure, you can socialize [with clients] over coffee, but it means you won’t 
get new clients and you won’t get to reinvest the clients’ wealth, and when you don’t get to 
reinvest it, your company won’t make much profit. The wealth management is, after all, also 
based on appropriately reusing the existing wealth.” (Private banker in an investment firm, 
20 years of experience) 
 
Despite identifying first and foremost as finance experts, economic interpreters and advi-
sors, all professionals also recognize that private banking is, in the end, business like any 
other and making profit for the employer is necessary. Thus, being a knowledgeable fi-
nance expert is not enough to belong and to be successful in private banking; one has to 
also be able to execute deals that are profitable, for both the client and the employer. 
Further, in today’s highly competitive world, being able to make profit requires ambition, 
or even “balls”: 
 
“You need to be able to present clients with solutions and you need to get them to make a 
decision. A kind of sales technique, you need to possess that.” (Private banker in a bank, 28 
years of experience) 
 
“You got to remember that this is sales work. We are salesmen. The bank makes its business 
by selling products. A certain kind of ambition, or sales skills, that’s important too.” (Asset 
manager in a bank, 11 years of experience) 
 
“You have to possess a fighting spirit. You have to be ambitious, persistent, but also humble 
in a way. - - It takes patience too, but maybe that perseverance and then ambition, that you 
hate losing, that’s it. That certain manner. You have to have, well, balls to do this. That’s 
what it takes.” (Asset manager in an investment firm, 8 years of experience) 
 
One of the recurring themes in the interviews was indeed the rather intense competition 
in the field of private banking. Customers can, at any moment, compare the achieved 
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results to the market index and to the profits of solutions offered by other market actors. 
Further, the number of actors in the field has increased considerably, alongside the variety 
of different investment products available to investors. Differentiating oneself in a posi-
tive light is therefore a great challenge, and often professionals get only one, short oppor-
tunity to do it: 
 
“It’s difficult to think of a field as competitive as finance. Our customers can daily and at 
every moment compare the result to the index and the solutions offered by competitors. And 
you get feedback for your work immediately, sometimes even very bluntly. The client can 
state they are giving their wealth to several competing companies at once and, after seeing 
how well each one does, they’ll choose the one they want to continue with.” (Asset manager 
in a bank, 20 years of experience) 
 
“If you think about it, you’ve sold your company and got for instance 5 or 6 million for it, 
the money is on your bank account, and suddenly 15 dudes from different places start calling 
you. So how you set yourself apart from those others so you’ll get to the next stage, i.e. the 
client lets you call again. [laughs] That’s the big challenge and naturally everyone always 
praises themselves to the skies.” (Asset manager in an investment firm, 8 years of experience) 
 
Indeed, having that perseverance and ambition, “fighting spirit”, and hating to “lose” 
can be considered a deal breaker; without that, one will not succeed and cannot belong in 
private banking: 
 
“Yeah, that fighting spirit. If you don’t have that, I’ll say-. And you won’t enjoy. You’ll realize 
that this isn’t a place for you.” (Asset manager in an investment firm, 8 years of experience) 
 
The intense and growing competition is not unproblematic, neither for the private 
banking professionals nor their clients. The increase in the competition translates to pres-
sures to decrease margins, which in turn demands higher sales and/or lower expenses. 
The increased emphasis on sales has transformed many places into “pure sales organiza-
tions”, as described by some of the interviewees, characterized by centralized market an-
alyzing and portfolio management done in the Helsinki area. In such a model, the “real” 
finance professionals work in Helsinki and concentrate fully on the financial tasks such 
as analyzing markets and news as well as managing clients’ investments. The sales agents 
(often still holding the title of a wealth manager), with whom clients meet, are not per-
ceived by many of the interviewees to be even “real” professionals: they are just clients’ 
contact people who arrange the deals and need not be experts in financial matters or have 
any connection with the actual investing of clients’ funds. As these wealth managers have 
no expert financial knowledge, they can potentially recommend their clients to buy in-
vestment products which are unsuitable to them. As the interviewees describe, in the 
worst case neither the wealth manager nor the client even knows what the product is and 
what kind of risk it involves. Further, as the clients have no connection with the people 
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actually managing the funds, there is a risk of misunderstandings and unpleasant sur-
prises. Or, even worse, in some places the wealth managers knowingly recommend un-
suitable products to clients simply because these yield the biggest compensation for the 
professionals.  
This tendency towards “pure sales organizations” and the strong emphasis on sales is 
perceived to be frustrating and problematic and, coupled with the increasing reporting 
obligations and other changes in the field, causes stress and discomfort for some profes-
sionals: 
 
 “Under the current regulation one ought to be an agent and not a wealth manager [who is 
in direct contact with clients] and that role is not very comfortable. Portfolios are managed 
completely elsewhere and the clients don’t have any connection with that and so they are just 
as surprised as I am when something goes wrong.” (Senior private banker in a bank, 30 
years of experience) 
 
“No one here wants to start naming competitors, who’re acting unethically, but let’s say that 
the kind of aggressive selling of obscure products quickly to clients, who don’t understand 
what they’re buying, there’s just been quite a lot of that.” (Private banker in a bank, 28 years 
of experience) 
 
“[At my former workplace] many really good, experienced wealth managers quit and left for 
completely different fields, because they just couldn’t stand it anymore. They really couldn’t 
stand this change. Reporting, robotics, everything changed. Add to that this awful-, how much 
you have to sell and sell and sell and everyone’s fighting.” (Asset manager in an investment 
firm, 8 years of experience) 
4.4 To be a “real” professional is to balance the conflicting roles  
Due to their multiple simultaneous roles, private banking professionals routinely face 
conflicting demands: they must constantly balance making profit, i.e. selling products, 
with providing personalized expert knowledge and advice in their work. This requires 
them to be, on one hand, ambitious, passionate and even aggressive and, on the other 
hand, down-to-earth, analytical, cool and collected while also remaining service-oriented 
and pleasant to socialize with. 
The interviewed professionals resolve this tension resulting from the conflicting de-
mands to make profit and provide good advice by adopting a perspective long enough. 
They argue that, in the long run, engaging is self-serving behavior will be damaging and 
unwise: providing bad advice or, even worse, deceiving the client will result in the loss 
of trust and the destruction of the relationship, leading to the loss of that client and, as 
clients often talk with each other, many other clients might be lost as well. The company 




“You can’t make it in this business if you sell the client something only for your own benefit, 
trying to get the best possible solution for yourself, to meet certain sales targets or, like in 
some places where commissions are a part of the salary, to get the biggest commission. If 
you do that, you can make it for maybe a year, but that career will be short-lived, because 
the clients are smart. They will know they are being played and when they realize that they 
will change banks.” (Asset manager in a bank, 11 years of experience) 
 
Thus, the interviewees feel that to truly make it in private banking, it is essential to 
exchange short-term profits for long-term success: even though success might be earned 
slower this way, it is built on a stable foundation and the relationship with the client will 
be a strong one, resulting in a committed client and a higher payout in the long run. In 
practice this means always recommending the client only solutions that are genuinely 
suitable to them, even when they are not the most profitable option for the employer or 
the private banking professional: 
 
“It’s essential that you recommend the kind of products you genuinely believe are suitable to 
this client and won’t let greed direct your sales. That greed can easily blind you.” (Asset 
manager in an investment firm, 8 years of experience) 
 
Other resolutions to the tension between making profit and providing genuine, high-
quality advice are (on the organizational level) (1) having realistic sales targets and (2) 
only a modest portion (if any) of the private banking professionals’ salary depending on 
sales. Further, in some places, bonuses are not based on individual success but on the 
success of the team and/or the whole organization, promoting teamwork and genuine 
value to customers instead of intracompany competition and simply high sales. 
In the long run, the ultimate measure of success as a private banking professional is 
thus the ability to produce client satisfaction which, interestingly, does not necessarily 
correlate with being able to give financially optimal recommendations, i.e. get the client 
the highest possible profit for their risk level. The quality of advice only has to be good 
enough as there are other factors that might compensate or even be more important to the 
client than getting the highest possible profit. From this perspective too, then, it is essen-
tial for private banking professionals to balance their multiple roles in work; overly em-
phasizing the role of a finance expert at the expense of other roles will not do either.  
Indeed, the deciding factor for clients is ultimately the feeling of being genuinely taken 
care of and that depends equally on the professional’s economic and financial skills and 
their interpersonal skills and willingness to help clients. Clients want to be truly heard: 
they need to feel their needs, desires and limits are understood and respected, and they 
are treated as valuable individuals with a unique life situation and need for solutions. 
Everything from the basic communication to the actual investment decisions must happen 
on the client’s terms and if the private banking professional cannot accommodate this 




“After all, we all have generally the same products to offer. In the end it comes to what kind 
of service the client gets, what the wealth manager is like, how the chemistry between them 
works, how the client’s needs are listened to, how they are resolved. We don’t have particu-
larly exceptional products here. We don’t have any better a crystal ball to forecast the future, 
where the markets are going, than the competitors. In the end, what the client feels like, when 
they walk through those doors, is what determines, where they will do their business.” (Asset 
manager in a bank, 11 years of experience) 
 
As described in chapter 4.2, the relationship between private banking professionals 
and their clients can indeed be a close one. Although beneficial to the client and even 
necessary for the quality of the wealth management, the closeness of the relationship be-
tween the client and the wealth manager is not, however, unproblematic. Often, when the 
relationship has stabilized and the client has learned to trust the wealth manager’s judge-
ment, the professionals can gain “unofficial” power over their clients: even when clients 
are paying for consultative wealth management, they might agree to any suggestions and, 
in a way, stop thinking about the decisions themselves: 
 
“In consultative wealth management the power [of the private banking professional] depends 
partially on the asset manager’s experience in the sense that people listen more easily to a 
more experienced asset manager and partially on the relationship with the client in such a 
way that in the beginning clients can be more skeptical and demand more or more detailed 
arguments, but when the relationship with the client has stabilized, when you have won the 
client’s trust, the client can trust the asset manager more. - - It can be, for example, when I 
call a client who’s at the airport about to board a flight and say ‘Hi, it’s [name], can you 
talk?’, they say ‘Yeah, make it quick’. And I suggest, for example, ‘Let’s buy Nokia’ and the 
client can either accept straight away or maybe ask for my reasoning or how much the stock 
is, but often in a long relationship the client trusts the asset manager’s expertise and vision. 
And the whole phone call can be over in 30 seconds.” (Asset manager in a bank, 20 years of 
experience) 
 
Combining this “unofficial power” with the pressure to make profit and meet sales 
targets results in a situation where private banking professionals face a strong temptation 
to abuse their power and engage in self-serving behavior. Clients thus expose themselves 
to the risk of being taken advantage of. However, the situation is problematic for the 
professionals too because even if they resist the temptation to abuse their power over 
clients, they still risk the clients starting to blame them for unsuccessful investment deci-
sions, destroying the carefully built relationship: 
 
“But it’s extremely dangerous if the client outsources decision-making to the wealth man-
ager. The client forgets that the wealth manager is not the driver. I know from years of expe-
rience clients who say ‘Well, of course we do that. If you think this is good, then of course 
we do that.’ It’s very common in long relationships. The last sentence: ‘Yeah yeah, let’s do 
that’. It doesn’t matter, if the client won’t blame the wealth manager, if something goes 
poorly, and says instead ‘It’s my fault since I made this decision’. But if the client doesn’t 





All in all, therefore, the responsibility in private banking is indeed great: to succeed in 
the long run and to belong in the sphere of private banking, professionals must always 
remember to consider their clients’ best in all their recommendations and decisions, resist 
the temptation to take advantage of the potential power they have over their clients and 
even give up that power by reminding the clients of the situation, if necessary. Further, to 
honor the client and the unique relationship with them, when the inevitable unsuccessful 
decisions are made, the professionals have to be fully transparent, promptly informing 
their clients, and humbly bear the responsibility without letting it affect the quality of 
their work or their own wellbeing: 
 
“Mistakes happen. We’re all humans. Human errors happen and you have to inform the 
client immediately about them, that ‘this and this happened and it can be seen here and here’. 
If you get caught with your pants down, that trust is gone and the client will leave.” (Asset 
manager in an investment firm, 8 years of experience) 
 
“The biggest challenge is the responsibility in this work, and it requires a great ability to 
handle stress. The responsibility in this work is extremely big, when you give people invest-
ment advice and usually people follow this advice. And no one can always give good advice, 
sometimes you make unsuccessful calls. If you can’t handle that, you’ll burn yourself out 
quickly.” (Asset manager in a bank, 20 years of experience) 
 
When asked, most interviewees perceive there to be a distinctive culture or a feeling 
of togetherness among private banking professionals. Those, who do not agree, see pri-
vate banking professionals as simply too heterogeneous a group within which conflicting 
subcultures exist. However, a closer, discursive analysis reveals that, despite the opposite 
answers to the original question, in the end all interviewees perceive the situation simi-
larly: all interviewed professionals feel it takes both specific skills and knowledge as well 
as particular personal qualities to belong in the sphere of private banking and to be suc-
cessful. Not just anybody can make it; those private banking professionals who truly be-
long are of a particular “type” of people. Most importantly, the interviewed professionals 
discursively separate the “real” professionals from “those others”, who work in the field 
but are not considered to be “real” professionals.  
Interestingly, the interviewees often distinct between finance professionals working 
under different titles in private banking (e.g. analysts, wealth/portfolio managers and 
those who develop new products) and these “classes” or groups of people are perceived 
to be fundamentally different. Analysts are generally referred to as more “nerdy”, empha-
sizing their cold intellectuality, analytical skills and profound knowledge of finance and 
economic theories, while wealth/portfolio managers (the group to which the interviewees 
themselves belong) are considered more well-rounded, simultaneously cool and collected 
but also passionate and ambitious, rational, and having both basic skills in finance and 
good interpersonal skills. Those, who develop new products (especially derivatives), are 
perceived and described to be “a whole different breed” altogether: by calling them “those 
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propeller heads building doomsday contraptions”, they are branded as a sort of mad sci-
entists of finance, i.e. simultaneously brilliant and potentially dangerous.  
However, all these different “classes”, despite being perceived as fundamentally dif-
ferent from one another, are readily accepted as “real” professionals belonging in private 
banking. Those “others” that the interviewees discursively exclude are the “aggressive, 
immoral salesmen” who do not necessarily possess finance expertise and who abuse their 
power over naïve customers, pushing them to buy unsuitable, often overly complex and/or 
expensive financial products which, through commissions, mostly benefit the salesmen 
themselves. Basically, in summary, belonging in private banking and being a “real” pro-
fessional takes and means being able to successfully balance the conflicting demands of 
the multiple simultaneous roles; those who are unable to do so and succumb to the temp-
tation of self-serving behavior are quickly and strictly deemed to be unprofessional and 
to not truly belong in private banking.  
4.5 Private banking professionals and representations of investing 
Analyzing how the interviewees discursively construct the representations of investing, 
investors and financial markets in their accounts reveals that, in general, the interviewees 
tend to regard investing and financial markets in a similar manner as neoclassical finance 
theories and models. Investing is perceived, quite simplistically, in terms of risk and 
profit, described in almost naturalistic terms, and generally stripped of all social and cul-
tural aspects.  
When talking about investing, markets and share prices, the interviewees casually use 
terms such as “corrective movements”, “over/undervalued”, “economic cycles”, “stock 
market crash”, “price swings” and “pricing distortion”. Further, as exemplified in the fol-
lowing quotes, (sharply) falling prices are deemed “completely normal” after a long pe-
riod of rising prices and, similarly, it is perceived to be self-evident that the market will 
rise again after a crash: 
 
“It’s a completely normal corrective movement after a long time of bull markets. Of course, 
the upcoming weeks will tell whether the market falls more.” (Private banker in a bank, 28 
years of experience) 
 
“Because from time to time the share prices crash, so [it’s important to make sure that] the 
client can then continue and understands that the market does rise again.” (Private banker 
in a bank, 17 years of experience) 
 
“Some are after that corrective movement on the market. When it comes, it’s my job to offer 





Overall, such a discourse implies that 1) there is a correct price for a share, but the 
market price might differ from it more or less, and 2) market lives its own life, accordingly 
to steady mechanics and laws, much like the ocean, sometimes rising and sometimes fall-
ing, leaving the professionals with the only possibility of trying to remain afloat by suc-
cessfully reading the movements and navigating through the rising and falling waves (i.e. 
share prices). 
Further, notice the interviewees do not use the word “if”, but “when” as well as the 
phrase “from time to time” when talking about sharply declining prices or financial 
crashes. In other words, within this representation, it is not a question of whether eco-
nomic depressions and booms, drastic price changes and even financial crises will occur, 
but when they will. Thus, there is a fatalistic tone to this representation of the market as 
a system governed by universal, unchangeable laws: the economy is seen (much like the 
nature) as going through cycle after cycle, with the occasional financial crashes suddenly 
hitting quite like tsunamis, unavoidably and destructively. Consequently, within this per-
ception, individuals do not have any power over the actions on/of the market, which im-
plies they bear no responsibility over them; market actors can only try and sail the market 
according to the best of their ability. 
Indeed, professionals tend to regard investing in general as an individualistic activity 
free from the wider societal considerations. For example, in the interviewees’ accounts, 
the goals for and limits of investing are determined by the individual investor’s needs, 
and the effects of investing on the real economy and wider society are generally not con-
sidered until prompted by the interviewer. Most professionals do consider the ethicalness 
of investing to be an important aspect, too, but either feel moral questions are “in the eye 
of the beholder”, making them a personal and individualistic choice (i.e. that of the client 
whose money goes into the investment), or view the whole issue through an economic 
lens, simplifying the question to be about risk and profit by claiming a company engaging 
in unethical actions cannot be a good investment. Thus, all ethical and moral considera-
tions generally fall out of the scope of private banking professionals’ work and so profes-
sionals can simply focus on getting the optimal risk-profit payout within the limits their 
employer and clients determine. 
 
“Well, I’d say basically that an unethical company will not succeed in the long run and is 
thus not a good investment.” (Asset manager in a bank, 20 years of experience) 
 
“One ought to think a little where they invest. But that’s everyone’s private business. I can’t 
moralize that too much.” (Private banker in a bank, 28 years of experience) 
 
“It’s really fashionable now to talk about all sorts of responsible investments and so on. It’s 
important to always remember that ethics and moral are in the eye of the beholder.” (Senior 




However, although the interviewed professionals tend to describe investing in very 
objective and “distant” terms, almost as if referring to a natural phenomenon, this repre-
sentation is not value-neutral. Investing is regarded generally in a positive light, even as 
a moral obligation of an individual, especially if they are wealthy. Money is described as 
requiring “taking care of” and letting one’s wealth just “lie” on a bank account is per-
ceived as unwise, even stupid: 
 
“I think anyone can start [investing]; there are no age limits or minimum wealth require-
ments. And everyone should start.” (Private banker in an investment firm, 10 years of expe-
rience) 
 
“After all, nowadays it is everyone’s business to save up a bit money and invest.” (Asset 
manager in a bank, 11 years of experience) 
 
“Then, if you possess more money - -, that money needs to be taken care of a bit more.” 
(Private banker in an investment firm, 20 years of experience) 
 
Therefore, within this representation, not investing, as an example of bad economic 
practices, appears as an irresponsible, even immoral, choice. Indeed, interestingly, even 
though investing is regarded as an individualistic activity where the investor decides the 
level of risk and all other, for example ethical, limitations on their own, without having 
to worry about the social implications of their decisions (as there are perceived to be 
none), the decision whether or not to engage in the investment activities in the first place 
is not given the same status, but is viewed as socially significant. In other words, within 
this representation, deciding not to invest will mark the individual as stupid or irrespon-
sible, while the decision to make risky investments and/or not consider the ethicalness of 
one’s investments will not result in any social consequences or stigma. The act of invest-
ing itself is regarded as positive and valuable, even if the investments turn out to be un-
profitable or unethical. 
Even though the interviewees mostly construct investing as an individualistic, socially 
unproblematic and even desirable activity and financial markets in the neoclassical, nat-
uralistic, even fatalistic manner as a system of unchangeable laws and mechanisms living 
its own life, independent of individual investors, they also appear to be well aware of 
alternative representations of investing and financial markets, actively challenging them 
in their communication when that is perceived necessary. 
For instance, in their accounts, the interviewees routinely use the term “(get) 
wealthy11” instead of “(get) rich12”. This could potentially be a strategy to distance in-
vesting from any negative practices sometimes associated with rich people, such as the 
abuse of power, lavish use of money, and rude behavior. Discursively stating that private 
                                                 
11 In Finnish: “vaurastua” 
12 In Finnish: “rikastua” 
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banking professionals help their clients to get wealthy (i.e. possess a long-term financial 
wellbeing) instead of helping them get rich (i.e. get loads of money in possibly a short 
period of time) makes not only investing but also the work of finance professionals appear 
in a more positive light. It also “normalizes” investing, i.e. make it appear as ordinary, 
socially acceptable behavior for anyone, not something that is only possible for the rich 
elite.  
The same kind of discursive distancing from negative practices and conceptions can 
be seen in the interviewees’ tendency to strictly draw a line between the “real” private 
banking professionals and their work and the “others” (i.e. the perceived not-true-profes-
sionals) working in the field. As argued in chapters 4.3 and 4.4, private banking profes-
sionals face the temptation of engaging in self-serving behavior, and the representation 
of finance professionals as immoral, selfish and pushy salesmen can be seen as a threat 
to the positive identity of finance professionals. Simply denying the existence of such 
behavior in private banking is impossible as it is well-known both within the industry and 
outside of it that incidences of aggressive selling and deceiving clients in order to make 
profit have occurred. Thus, by validating that, indeed, such immoral and irresponsible 
actions do happen in the finance industry while simultaneously implying or claiming that 
the actors engaging in such a behavior are not “true” finance professionals allows the 
interviewees to distance themselves and their work from such negative activities, preserve 
their positive identity and even discursively challenge the representation.  
Further, some professionals even readily admit that their own perception of investing 
and private banking has changed since starting to work in the field. For example, in the 
following quote, the interviewee states “a bank is not a place for me” and especially in-
vesting related work is deemed unsuitable as the interviewee did not want to “be involved 
with rich people”, preferring to work with “just common people”. Thus, it appears that 
originally the interviewee perceived investing in quite a negative way, as an activity ap-
propriate only for the rich elite, and the banking sector as a field where s/he does not or 
cannot belong.  
 
“First I said that a bank is not a place for me. It really isn’t. Then, when I started working in 
a bank, I said ‘Ho-hum, I will definitely not be here for long’. And now I’ve soon been here 
for 32, 33 years.  - - And when I started working in a bank, I said that I definitely won’t get 
into investing. That I don’t want to be involved with rich people. I want to work with just 
common people and that’s my thing.” (Private banker in an investment firm, 20 years of 
experience) 
 
However, since starting to work in a bank and in private banking, the interviewee has 
changed their perception as exemplified by the following quote. Here the interviewee 
argues that investing is for the masses, i.e. the common people, not for any sort of “rich 
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elite”, and that changing people’s perceptions towards this view, “teaching” people to see 
investing in a “correct” way, would be important.  
 
“There is a great potential to do what teachers13 used to do in the past. [Gives an example 
about investing monthly savings in a fund.] Something like this, you know, that this [invest-
ing] is for the masses.” (Private banker in an investment firm, 20 years of experience) 
 
All interviewees also report having come across what they perceive to be misconcep-
tions about the field, and most also perceive these misconceptions to cause them incon-
venience, either in the form of making their job more difficult or even as a social stigma 
affecting their life outside their job. The commonly mentioned notions that interviewees 
perceive to be misconceptions include 1) thinking that investing is only for the rich, 2) 
thinking investing is only for the morally corrupt, 3) equating investing with gambling, 
i.e. a high-risk activity that will either make one extraordinarily rich or make one lose all 
their savings, and 4) thinking banking professionals are living the life of luxury. 
Some interviewees speculate these (perceived) misconceptions might result from the 
diversity in the field: as mentioned, it is well-known that there have been incidences of 
selling unsuitable products to clients or even deceiving clients, and people who have been 
subject to such acts or attempts of them or heard of such behavior might assume that all 
finance professionals behave in such a way. Many interviewees also emphasize the influ-
ence of media such as newspapers and movies: 
 
“Media lives on negative news, making shocking headlines. We just saw a minor corrective 
movement of a few percentages on the market. Immediately there are headlines like ‘Stock 
market crash’ all over and they’re selling the paper with such headlines. For the common 
lay people that doesn’t create the kind of feeling that ‘yeah, of course I dare to invest’, be-
cause the stock ‘crashed’ and that could happen to anyone. Where are those positive head-
lines about economic development? Those boring headlines like ‘Invest now and hold for the 
next ten years, profit from dividends and the possible appreciation of the stock, get wealthy’.” 
(Asset manager in a bank, 11 years of experience) 
 
“I think reporting shouldn’t be so colored anymore. That if you are a big investor… Well, 
think about Wahlroos. A big investor. A total bad guy. But what if you flip it the other way 
around? A big investor pays this much taxes on dividends, this much other taxes, and those 
[taxes] make such and such things possible in this society. - - I’d hope the press always 
provided two opposite perspectives, because - - there are always two sides to a story.” (Pri-
vate banker in an investment firm, 20 years of experience) 
 
                                                 
13 In Finnish the interviewee says “- - ennen vanhaan opettajat teki kansankynttilöinä - -”, using an old term 
“kansankynttilä” which portrays teachers as people who act as “candles”, i.e. bringers of light, enlighteners, 
for the common people. 
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“These movies and articles and others have created a wrong picture about this world. If we 
consider, for example, individual stock investments – they are always talked about, investing 
is often equated with stock investing even though interest rates, real estate and others are 
really significant too – well, that’s owning a part of a company. Everything should be based 
on that company making profit and paying out dividends, and those dividends make the profit, 
not the appreciation of the stock. - - So many have a completely wrong idea about investing. 
They think only about the rising and falling of stock prices.” (Private banker in a bank, 17 
years of experience) 
 
Further, other perceived misconceptions mentioned include regarding investing as ex-
traordinarily difficult or requiring special skills or the use to obscure instruments. Some 
also mention that the policymakers have “a completely wrong idea” about investing, 
which results in, for example, policies favoring the use of indirect investments instead 
direct investments, resulting in higher expenses and lower profits for the clients.   
Lastly, even the fact that the interviewees report having had to persuade at least some 
of their clients to invest in the first place and that they need to “earn the clients’ trust” 
implies that (1) people do not want to invest (possibly because they perceive it to be too 
risky or somehow socially undesirable, for example, unethical or immoral or simply not 
for the social group the person identifies with) and that (2) private banking professionals 
are not inherently trusted. The latter might seem natural considering people tend to be 
careful and somewhat reserved with their personal matters (such as finances) when meet-
ing new people. However, if contrasted with the interaction one has with another group 
of professionals, doctors, the issue is not so clear-cut anymore: when people get sick, 
most choose to visit a doctor and tend to trust the diagnosis and treatment they are given. 
However, when discussing their financial issues, people are more apprehensive and sus-
picious of the finance professional’s motive for the advice given. Yet, providing financial 
advice and medical advice are both similarly regulated activities and thus there is an equal 
reason to trust each group of professionals. The fact that people do not do so implies that 
there are “non-rational”, possibly social and/or cultural reasons for this.  
In summary, a discursive analysis of the interviews points to, on one hand, a strongly 
homogeneous way of perceiving investing, investors and financial markets among the 
interviewed private banking professionals, suggesting a common ideology, and, on the 
other hand, the existence of multiple alternative representations of investing, investors 
and financial markets in the society. These alternatives affect not only the daily work of 
private banking professionals but also their identity construction, as the professionals 




To summarize the results presented in the previous chapter and to answer the first of the 
research questions posed in chapter 1.1, there are three distinct roles Finnish private bank-
ing professionals see as meaningful and important to adopt and perform in their work life 
and which contribute to their professional identity: the role of a finance expert, the role 
of an advisor and confidant, and the role of a salesman. 
The core of the first role, the one of a finance expert, is the specialized, in-depth 
knowledge of all financial and economic issues: finance experts are expected to recognize 
meaningful pieces of news out of the constant flood of (financial and non-financial) in-
formation and to interpret the data correctly (i.e. know how each event will affect the 
markets), to recognize investment opportunities by perceiving the “correct” prices of in-
vestments and how much the market prices differ from those, and to execute needed ac-
tions on markets correctly (i.e. use appropriate instruments in a timely manner, neither 
reacting too strongly nor too mildly to any piece of news). In essence, finance experts are 
expected to be able to transform the flood of information into profitable investment deci-
sions. Achieving this requires constantly keeping up with the latest developments and 
innovations in the finance world as well as closely monitoring and filtering the infor-
mation available in the stream of news and the movements of markets. In other words, as 
finance experts, private banking professionals are expected to be analytical, rational, pro-
active and vigilant and to thrive in the quickly changing environment; within this role 
there is no room for irrationality, emotional responses, taking breaks or slowing down.  
The core of the second role, the one of an advisor and confidant, is the ability to pro-
vide clients with solutions to their problems as well as a feeling of being genuinely taken 
care of: advisors are expected to discover and understand their clients’ (true) needs, even 
if they go unexpressed, and to provide comprehensive, personally tailored solutions to 
them. Further, advisors are expected to provide emotional support during any potential 
hardships (particularly economic downturns and the like), and to act as confidants of sorts, 
discussing the clients’ private matters. Thus, highly developed interpersonal and commu-
nication skills are essential: as advisors, private banking professionals are expected to be 
emotionally perceptive, tactful, service-oriented, confidence-inspiring and pleasant to so-
cialize with, as well as to be able to quickly adapt to different situations and communica-
tion styles. In addition, possessing a high tolerance for stress is necessary: not only do 
advisors bear a heavy responsibility for the financial advice they provide to their clients, 
but they also face their clients’ possible emotional outbursts. 
The core of the third role, the one of a salesman, is the ability to generate profit for the 
employer, i.e. sell investment products to clients. In today’s highly competitive world, 
persuading the clients requires first and foremost high ambition, i.e. a certain kind of 
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boldness (even bordering on audacity), and perseverance, i.e. having a high tolerance for 
rejection. Having a high tolerance for stress is equally essential to survive in the highly 
competitive field of private banking. All in all, as salesmen, private banking professionals 
are expected to be confident, persuasive, persistent and greedy to execute a deal; within 
this role, any kind of shyness or indifference is considered a fatal flaw. 
When comparing the roles to one another, some common features can be found. 
Firstly, all roles require having a high tolerance for stress: for finance experts the stress 
is caused by the hectic, constantly changing environment, for advisors it is the result of 
the heavy responsibility of providing financial advice and of facing the client’s possible 
emotional outbursts, and for salesmen it arises from the intense competition within the 
field. Secondly, all roles also require being willing to work hard, taking initiative and 
having a strong personal interest in the work. Indeed, private banking appears as a career 
one needs to be fully invested in to succeed: it is not a regular nine-to-five job but a 
demanding way of life in which one’s work and free time routinely overlap and are rela-
tively fluid concepts. In the finance expert’s role this is apparent in the need to constantly 
keep up with the news and market movements as well as the developments of the field of 
finance, while in the roles of an advisor and a salesman this takes the form of being easily 
reachable to clients at all times, including evenings, weekends and even holidays. 
However, interestingly, while the role of a finance expert and the one of an advisor 
and confidant are complementary and can easily be integrated, the role of a salesman is 
in clear conflict with the other two roles: while the salesman’s role requires private bank-
ing professionals to maximize (or at least generate some) profit for their employer, the 
roles of a finance expert and an advisor require them to provide high-quality advice to 
their clients, even if that advice results in less (or even no) profit for the employer. Further, 
comparing the personal qualities needed in each role, there are some clearly conflicting 
demands: as salesmen, private banking professionals are expected to be persistent, ambi-
tious and even aggressive, while as finance experts they need to remain down-to-earth, 
analytical, cool and collected, and as advisors they need to be service-oriented and pleas-
ant to socialize with, always respecting the clients’ boundaries.  
Comparing the roles to the representations of financial phenomena described in earlier 
research and depicted in figure 1 in chapter 2.3, interesting findings arise. For one, it is 
easy to see how each role matches particular representations. The role of a finance expert 
fits perfectly with the representation of markets as a complex, yet measurable, calculable 
and manageable world of economic laws and mechanisms and investing as a rational 
wealth-maximizing activity requiring specialized knowledge and skills as well as constant 
vigilance. In other words, this role matches representations C, F, G, K and L in table 1. 
The representation and the role of a finance expert both stress the importance of rational 
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analysis of the market and the cognitive aspect of investing as well as the need for vigi-
lance in the constantly changing market; effectively, investing is rendered problem-solv-
ing of sorts. The role of an advisor and confidant, on the other hand, matches well the 
representation of markets as a dangerous environment and investing as a job for profes-
sionals (i.e. representation J in table 1) as well as the representation of markets as a site 
of emotion and excitement (i.e. representation H in table 1). In essence, the clients’ prone-
ness to emotional responses makes investing dangerous for them but, with professionals 
as their advisors providing emotional support and personally tailored solutions, they are 
able to partake in financial markets. Note how, interestingly, just like the roles of a finance 
expert and of an advisor are complementary and can be easily integrated, also the repre-
sentations they match are complementary and can be combined, as argued in chapter 2.3 
and depicted in figure 1. This implies that both the representations and the roles have the 
same or at least compatible ideological foundation; this will be explored in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
As for the third role, the salesman’s role’s emphasis on profit-making and –maximiz-
ing and the temptation to engage in self-serving behavior at the clients’ expense matches 
the representation of markets as a destructive environment where immoral acts are una-
voidable and of investing as a game where naïve customers are used to make profits (i.e. 
representation D in table 1). This should not be understood as to imply that the salesman’s 
role is inherently an immoral one or that as salesmen private banking professionals en-
gage in immoral or socially disruptive behavior; instead, it is noteworthy that there ap-
pears to be no alternative representation for the salesman’s role. This has interesting im-
plications.  
While the roles of a finance expert and of an advisor are clearly positive, socially pres-
tigious ones, requiring qualities generally regarded as positive (such as intelligence, ra-
tionality, emotional control and amiability) and admirable, socially desirable behavior 
(such as providing knowledge and helping people) as well as matching representations 
which portray investors and finance professionals in either unproblematic or even favor-
able light, in contrast the role of a salesman not only contains negatively regarded ele-
ments such as the temptation to engage in immoral self-serving behavior and take ad-
vantage of clients but it also matches the representation portraying investors and particu-
larly finance professionals in negative light.  
As described in chapter 2.2, in SIT categorization is regarded as an enriching, elabo-
rating sense-making activity: based on recognized features, “hints” of sorts, an object is 
categorized as something and when it is categorized, it attains more features; in a way, 
dots are connected to form a picture. Then, if the salesman’s role shares some elements 
with the negative representation of finance professionals as power-hungry, greedy and 
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immoral actors, it might be associated with these other aspects of the representation alt-
hough it does not inherently include them. In other words, simply the temptation to en-
gage in immoral behavior in the salesman’s role might lead to stereotype and associate 
the role with the negative behavior implied by the representation. 
As described in chapter 2.2, according to SIT 1) a person’s identity and behavior are 
linked and 2) people are motivated to think well of themselves and thus to adopt and 
maintain an identity they perceive as positive. Therefore, roles associated with negatively 
valued behavior become problematic and from this perspective the role of a salesman can 
be seen to threaten or even spoil the positive identity of private banking professionals. 
This interpretation is further supported by the fact that interviewees identify more 
strongly with the roles of a finance expert and of an advisor (i.e. the roles associated with 
unproblematic, positively regarded behavior and personal qualities as well as representa-
tions portraying finance professionals in unproblematic or favorable light) and, while they 
accept the role of a salesman as a necessary part of their work, the interviewees tend to 
discursively separate “real” private banking professionals from “the immoral, selfish and 
pushy salesmen” not considered to be real professionals.  
Therefore, the identity of private banking professionals and the construction of it is not 
simplistic or clear-cut: professionals need to not only resolve the tensions resulting from 
the conflicting demands of the multiple simultaneous roles they must play in their work 
life but they must also manage the negative effects the role of a salesman can have on 
their work identity. Further, as suggested by SRT, in their identity construction, private 
banking professionals need to take into consideration and incorporate, negotiate and/or 
contest the multiple alternative (social) representations of investing that conflict with their 
own perceptions.  
On the individual level, the interviewees resolve the above-mentioned tension and in-
tegrate the conflicting roles by adopting a perspective long enough: exchanging short-
term profits and always providing genuine advice and high-quality solutions results in 
strong, committed relationships with clients and a good, trustworthy reputation which 
lead to a higher payout in the long run. Thereby, the salesman’s role no longer conflicts 
with the finance expert’s and advisor’s roles. Further, this strategy of stressing the im-
portance of selling clients only products and solutions which are genuinely suitable and 
beneficial to them also downplays the importance of sales and the problematic role of a 
salesman, allowing private banking professionals to distance themselves from the nega-
tively regarded self-serving behavior and the associated representation portraying finance 
professionals as villains, thus preventing their identity from being “spoiled” and preserv-
ing their positive perception of self. However, on the societal level the negative represen-
tation continues to exist, causing private banking professionals inconvenience by forcing 
them to time and again contest and deflect the negative and problematic representation 
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threatening their positive identity. Thus, the maintenance of a positive identity is an on-
going struggle. 
In summary, the positively associated and socially prestigious roles of a finance expert 
and an advisor serve as the foundation for the identities of Finnish private banking pro-
fessionals, allowing them to think well of themselves. The socially problematic role of a 
salesman must, however, be integrated into the identity as well and, indeed, how this is 
done becomes what truly defines the identity of Finnish private banking professionals: to 
be a real private banking professional is to successfully balance the different roles and 
their conflicting demands. Those who are unable to do so and succumb to the temptation 
of self-serving behavior are deemed “just simple salesmen”, not real private banking pro-
fessionals, and to not truly belong in the sphere of private banking.  
Moving on to answer and discuss the second and third research questions, despite the 
earlier research presented in chapter 2.3 as well as the empirical results of this study 
pointing to the existence of multiple alternative representations of investing and financial 
markets in the society (some of which the professionals themselves may even have em-
braced and accepted as the truth before entering the field), there appears to be a strong 
ideological uniformity across Finnish private banking professionals. 
In general, professionals tend to perceive investing and financial markets quite sim-
plistically, in a manner of neoclassical finance theories and models, i.e. in terms of risk 
and profit. As described in more detail in chapter 4.5, Finnish private banking profession-
als tend to describe investing and markets are in almost naturalistic terms, implying the 
markets to be a system governed by universal, unchangeable laws, and there is even a 
fatalistic tone to this representation as the economy is seen (much like the nature) as going 
through cycle after cycle, with the occasional financial crashes hitting suddenly, unavoid-
ably and destructively. Within this perception, individuals do not have any power over 
the actions in/of the market, which implies they bear no responsibility over them; thereby 
investing is stripped of all ethical, social and cultural aspects and regarded simply as an 
individualistic taking care of one’s wealth, i.e. an activity whose consequences on the 
wider society are generally not considered. In other words, the professionals readily em-
brace and accept as the truth the representation of financial markets as a complex, yet 
measurable, calculable and manageable world of economic laws and mechanisms and of 
investing as a socially unproblematic, individualistic wealth-maximizing activity requir-
ing specialized knowledge and skills as well as constant vigilance (i.e. representations C, 
F, G, K and L in table 1).  
On one hand, the fact that there is strong ideological uniformity across professionals 
is, while interesting, not unexpected: as described in chapter 2.2, according to SRT when 
an individual is socialized into a particular social group (such as finance professionals or 
more specifically private banking professionals), they attain not only the content of social 
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knowledge of that group, but also the group’s dominant ways of thinking. In other words, 
it is expectable that all members of a particular social group perceive objects, persons and 
events meaningful to that social group similarly. Further, as described in chapter 2.1, fi-
nance literature and research tend to be quite monoparadigmatic, explaining people’s in-
vestment behavior and market movements by modelling investors as (hyper)rational, self-
ish utility maximizers and considering financial markets as simply the aggregate of indi-
viduals’ behavior and decisions. The result of this is a very uniform portrayal of investing 
and financial markets in scientific and professional literature and discussion. In other 
words, in their socialization into the field of finance and more specifically into private 
banking, the professionals simply do not generally come across other representations of 
investing and financial markets than the one of modern neoclassical finance theories. On 
the other hand, considering the differing educational backgrounds and other demographic 
factors of the interviewees as well as the availability of different representations of in-
vesting in the society at large, the degree of uniformity in ideology and perceptions is 
noteworthy and warrants further enquiry.  
Examining the available subject positions within this representation yields interesting 
observations. For the professionals, the available subject positions within this representa-
tion are those of rational wealth maximizers, active and capable financial experts, author-
ity figures and interpreters of economic events, and smart and responsible, even societally 
vital actors. These subject positions match perfectly the role of a finance expert which, as 
argued above, forms part of the foundation for their professional identity. In other words, 
the professionals’ perceptions of investing and professional identity are rooted in the same 
ideology, which, while only logical and thus not particular surprising, raises interesting 
questions: does the ideology adopted while being socialized into the group of finance 
professionals influence the construction of the professional identity or is it the other way 
around; is this particular ideology accepted as the truth because it allows unproblematic 
and even socially favorable subject positions, role and professional identity?  
While either or even both of the above might be true, it is nevertheless clear that adopt-
ing this perception of markets as measurable and manageable world of economic laws 
and mechanisms and of investing as socially unproblematic, individualistic wealth-max-
imizing activity allows private banking professionals to distance themselves from the po-
tentially problematic aspects of their job. Clearly, investing (like all consumption) has 
real life consequences; for example, investing in a company that engages in socially prob-
lematic or harmful behavior (such as the use of child labor, ecologically harmful prac-
tices, or even just trading in tobacco or gambling services) allows it to continue existing 
and potentially grow. Thus, by investing in such a company, investors can be seen to be 
indirectly responsible for the company’s actions and their negative consequences and 
therefore investing in such a company brands the individual as selfish and immoral, 
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threatening their positive identity. By discursively detaching investing from societal as-
pects, private banking professionals avoid having to consider whether their work is harm-
ful to the society or environment. In other words, adopting the neoclassical finance’s per-
ception of investing allows private banking professionals to continue identifying with the 
positive, unproblematic representation of them and deflect alternative, “hostile” portray-
als (e.g. representations A, D, M and N in table 1 and the corresponding representations 
depicted in figure 1) which threaten their positive identity. 
Moving on, notably, the professionals’ perception of investing is not value-neutral, as 
would fit the representation mentioned above. Instead, investing is regarded generally in 
a positive light, even as a moral obligation of an individual, particularly if they are 
wealthy. Curiously, the more money an individual possesses, the greater is their obliga-
tion to carefully consider how they manage the money: within the professionals’ percep-
tion, if one has little money, their investment options are more limited and it generally 
does not matter into which fund they invest, but if they have more wealth, the variety of 
available investment opportunities grows substantially and the investments must there-
fore be considered more carefully. Effectively, this transforms wealth into a burden of 
sorts: instead of making life easier, the greater one’s wealth is, the more effort they must 
put into maintaining and growing it. This perception can be seen as rooted in the idea of 
wealth and investing having intrinsic value (as opposed to having instrumental value) or, 
alternatively, in perceiving individuals’ needs and wants to be unlimited. 
This perception is in line with the representations of markets as a resource to be utilized 
or a fair market place and of investing as a moral obligation or a respectable trade and a 
responsible way to take care of one’s family (i.e. representations B, E and I in table 1 and 
the corresponding representations in figure 1). These representations not only match the 
role of an advisor, as discussed earlier in this chapter, but also in general present investing 
in socially favorable light, thus supporting the positive self-perception and identity of 
private banking professionals.  
In summary, Finnish private banking professionals tend to perceive investing first and 
foremost in terms of profit and risk, and as individualistic and thus socially unproblem-
atic, intrinsically valuable, responsible management and maximization of wealth. This 
perception largely matches the modern, neoclassical finance theories’ representation of 
investing and financial markets and the representations described by Preda (2001), 
Sjöberg (2004, Hirsto (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011), and Fuchs and Graf (2010), i.e. repre-
sentations C, F, G, K and L in table 1. Further, the professionals also perceive investing 
as the smart and responsible way of managing one’s wealth and thus as desirable behav-
ior, which also matches the representations (B, E and I in table 1) found in earlier research. 
Within these representations, private banking professionals and their work appear in pos-
itive, even prestigious light, which gives them legitimation in society as well as upholds 
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their positive identity. Simultaneously the representations discourage considerations of 
the need to, e.g. control financial markets and investing, and of the purpose of investing 
on the individual and the societal levels.  
As discussed in chapter 4.5, the results of this study also suggest the existence of mul-
tiple alternative, conflicting perceptions and social representations of investing in the so-
ciety. Although not the focus of this study, these alternative social representations are 
greatly impactful for Finnish private banking professionals as they not only shape the 
work of the professionals but also affect their identity construction, and thus they warrant 
a short discussion. 
Finnish private banking professionals readily recognize, describe and also challenge 
in their accounts the alternative social representations of investing which conflict with 
their own perceptions. For example, the professionals report routinely coming across 
what they perceive to be common misconceptions including thinking that investing is 
only for the morally corrupt, equating investing with gambling (i.e. a high-risk activity 
that will either make one extraordinarily rich or make one lose all their savings) and re-
garding banking professionals as immoral and/or living the life of luxury. In their daily 
work, private banking professionals are at times challenged by the alternative representa-
tions of investing and finance; for example, they might need to persuade and convince 
their clients that investing is not negative behavior (e.g. selfish, immoral, irresponsible, 
or dangerous) and to sometimes even defend themselves against prejudice. These alter-
native social representations of investing thus cause private banking professionals incon-
venience either in the form of making their job more difficult or even as a social stigma 
affecting their life outside their job. 
What is particularly interesting and noteworthy, also these alternative social represen-
tations match the representations described in earlier research by Preda (2001), Sjöberg 
(2004), and Fuchs and Graf (2010); the matching representations are A, D, M and N in 
table 1 and the corresponding representations in figure 1. As described, these representa-
tions portray investing in a negative way, as socially disruptive, immoral and/or irrespon-
sible, thereby making it socially problematic for the professionals as, according to SIT 
and SRT, people strive to adopt and uphold a positive, socially desirable identity. Not 
surprisingly but notably thus, these alternative representations are rejected by the private 
banking professionals as misconceptions, not only because they conflict with their own 
perceptions, but likely also because the subject position of an immoral, selfish and greedy 
“villain” these representations offer is not desirable for the professionals.  
Further, interestingly, as described earlier, those professionals who in their salesman’s 
role give into the temptation to engage in self-serving behavior and take advantage of 
their clients, thereby embracing and reconstructing this representation of finance profes-
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sionals as immoral, selfish, greedy villains, are discursively branded “just simple sales-
men”, not real private banking professionals. In such a way, professionals can be seen to 
(knowingly or subconsciously) attempt to prevent their (social) representation and group 
identity from being spoiled by the malpractices taking place in private banking. 
In summary and to wrap up the discussion of the results, this study’s empirical findings 
on the identity as well as the perceptions (i.e. social representations) of Finnish private 
banking professionals along with the alternative, conflicting social representations match 
the results of earlier research on representations of investing, investors and financial mar-
kets. The same kind of conflicting, contradictory representations of investing and inves-
tors (including finance professionals) are described in the studies of Preda (2001), Sjöberg 
(2004), Hirsto (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011), and Fuchs & Graf (2010). As described in chap-
ter 2.3, in media finance professionals are simultaneously regarded as indispensable ex-
perts, admired role models, and hated, immoral villains, and the findings of this study 
suggest this three-fold representation influences the construction of Finnish private bank-
ing professionals’ professional identity as well as their everyday work.  
Further, as mentioned, in accordance to the developed theoretical framework combin-
ing SIT, SRT and DP, Finnish private banking professionals’ identity as well as their 
perceptions of investing in general correlate with the positive and neutral representations 
of investing described in earlier research, while the alternative, conflicting social repre-
sentations of investing rejected as misconceptions by the professionals correlate with the 
more negative representations described in earlier research. Considering the developed 
figure 1 and the six dimensions found relevant for constructing and analyzing different 
representations of finance, it appears Finnish private banking professionals comfortably 
embrace and draw on representations on the top and right in figure 1 and construct invest-
ing in multiple ways as socially unproblematic, rational and having intrinsic value or as 
socially desirable (even essential), responsible, emotional and having instrumental value. 
In contrast, the professionals reject and challenge the representations on the bottom and 
left in figure 1. In other words, the representations in the blue, green and yellow areas of 
figure 1 are unproblematic representations and resources for the professionals to draw on, 
while the representations in the red area are problematic for the professionals and must 
be either avoided or, if need be, actively challenged. 
In short, the results of this study in general suggest that there indeed exist multiple 
alternative, conflicting social representations of investing (which could potentially ex-
plain people’s different investment behavior), and that these social representations, at 
least to a certain point, correlate with the different portrayals of investing circulating in 
the society (a finding also suggested by the study of Sjöberg (2004)). 
Overall, the results of this study suggest investing is a far more complex social phe-
nomenon than neoclassical finance theories present it to be and that people’s investment 
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behavior might not be completely explainable as simple, individualistic wealth maximi-
zation. Investing has social and cultural aspects that should not be ignored if we are to 
profoundly understand the behavior of investors and movements of markets and to pro-
mote optimal, i.e. both profitable as well as responsible and sustainable, investment be-
havior and strategies. Further, in contrast to existing research in SSF, this study presents 
a comprehensive theoretical framework rooted in social psychology for exploring invest-
ing as a social and cultural activity. This study’s empirical findings suggest the framework 
to be useful and it could be further developed to investigate and explain people’s investing 
behavior. Additionally, the developed figure 1 summarizes well the earlier research on 
the representations of investing, investors and financial markets and, along with the de-
veloped theoretical framework and the results of this study, provides a useful starting 




Motivated by the existence of multiple conflicting representations of investing, investors 
and financial markets in society and the lack of research on the social and cultural aspects 
of investing, this study set out to investigate how Finnish private banking professionals 
perceive themselves, their work and investing in general with the aim to contribute to the 
understanding of investing as a social and cultural activity and how factors other than 
“rational” wealth-maximization might influence people’s investment decisions.  
On a theoretical level, building on theories of social psychology, this study suggests 
an alternative framework to the mainstream neoclassical finance’s and the social studies 
of finance’s theories for explaining investment behavior and, based on the previous re-
search on representations of investing, investors and financial markets, presents a com-
prehensive mapping of representations of investing circulating in different Western soci-
eties as well as six dimensions relevant for analyzing, understanding and constructing 
these representations. These served as a guideline when collecting and interpreting the 
empirical data of the study.  
The empirical part of the study explores and discusses the perceptions and social rep-
resentations of Finnish private banking professionals. The data consists of eight semi-
structured, conversational interviews among Finnish private banking professionals and 
was analyzed and interpreted using both content analysis and methods of discourse anal-
ysis. The methodology and the methods used were chosen so as to collect thick, nuanced 
data and gain a holistic, detailed view which could serve as foundation for further inquiry 
into the topic.  
Summarizing the results, the positively associated and socially prestigious roles of a 
finance expert and an advisor form the basis for Finnish private banking professionals’ 
identities, but the socially problematic role of a salesman must be integrated into the iden-
tity as well, resulting in tensions. Successfully managing these tensions and balancing the 
different roles and their conflicting demands is what, in the perceptions of Finnish private 
banking professionals, defines “real” professionals and sets them apart from those others 
simply working in the field.  
As for the results on the perceptions of investing in general, Finnish private banking 
professionals tend to see investing first and foremost in a manner in accordance to neo-
classical finance theories, i.e. in terms of profit and risk, and as individualistic and thus 
socially unproblematic, intrinsically valuable, rational and responsible management and 
maximization of wealth, even a moral obligation of (wealthy) individuals. Within this 
representation, private banking professionals and their work appear in a positive, even 
prestigious light, which gives them legitimation in society as well as upholds their posi-
tive identity. Simultaneously the representation discourages considerations of the need to, 
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e.g. control financial markets and investing, and of the purpose of investing on the indi-
vidual and societal levels.  
Lastly, the results of the study also suggest the existence of multiple alternative, con-
flicting perceptions and social representations of investing in society and that these have 
consequences in everyday life. As described in earlier research on representations of in-
vesting and investors by Sjöberg (2004) and Fuchs & Graf (2010), in media finance pro-
fessionals are simultaneously regarded as indispensable experts, admired role models, 
and hated, immoral villains. The findings of this study suggest this three-fold representa-
tion influences both the construction of Finnish private banking professionals’ profes-
sional identity and their everyday work, implying the representations described in earlier 
research by Preda (2001), Sjöberg (2004), Hirsto (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011), and Fuchs & 
Graf (2010) to be not only representations, but in fact social representations of different 
social groups.  
Overall, this study’s empirical findings fit the developed theoretical framework com-
bining SIT, SRT and DP: as expectable, Finnish private banking professionals’ identity 
as well as their perceptions of investing in general correlate with the positive and neutral 
representations of investing described in earlier research by Preda (2001), Sjöberg (2004), 
Hirsto (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011), and Fuchs & Graf (2010), while the alternative, con-
flicting social representations of investing rejected as misconceptions by the professionals 
correlate with the more negative representations described in the earlier research.  
Considering the developed figure 1 and the six dimensions found relevant for con-
structing and analyzing different representations of finance, it appears Finnish private 
banking professionals comfortably embrace and draw on representations on the top and 
right in figure 1 and construct investing in multiple ways as socially unproblematic, ra-
tional and having intrinsic value or as socially desirable (even vital), responsible, emo-
tional and having instrumental value. In contrast, the professionals reject and challenge 
the representations on the bottom and left in figure 1. In other words, the representations 
in the blue, green and yellow areas of figure 1 are unproblematic representations and 
resources for the professionals to draw on, while the representations in the red area are 
problematic for the professionals and must be either avoided or, if need be, actively chal-
lenged. 
In short, the results of this study in general suggest that there indeed exist multiple 
alternative, conflicting social representations of investing (which could potentially ex-
plain people’s different investment behavior), and that these social representations, at 
least to a certain point, correlate with the different portrayals or representations of invest-
ing circulating in the society, a finding also suggested by the study of Sjöberg (2004). 
This indicates representations are not meaningless, but in fact greatly impactful and that 
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investing indeed is a far more complex social and cultural phenomenon than it is typically 
assumed to be in finance research.  
People’s investment behavior might not be completely explainable as simple, individ-
ualistic wealth maximization as it is presented in the (normative) neoclassical finance 
theories, and the social and cultural aspects of investing should not be ignored if we are 
to profoundly understand the behavior of investors and movements of markets and to 
promote optimal, i.e. both profitable as well as responsible and sustainable, investment 
behavior and strategies and to provide practical guidance to policymakers. For example, 
lowering small private investor’s tax rates to encourage investing among the middle class 
might prove ineffective, if the reasons for not investing are social and cultural (e.g. re-
garding investing as immoral or only for the very rich) as opposed to economic. In such 
a case, influencing people’s perceptions of and attitudes to investing, for example by 
providing alternative representations through education, would be more impactful. In a 
similar vein, attempts to encourage finance professionals to behave in a more ethically 
and socially conscious way might benefit from including social and ethical perspectives 
in their education. 
Summarizing the contribution of this study, in contrast to the (normative) neoclassical 
finance theories and the so far rather scattered and anecdotal studies of SSF, this study 
presents a comprehensive, yet tentative descriptive theoretical framework rooted in social 
psychology for exploring investing as a social and cultural activity along with tentative 
empirical evidence supporting the theoretical framework. Furthermore, the study summa-
rizes and integrates the results of earlier research on representations of investing, inves-
tors and financial markets into a useful mapping depicted in figure 1 and, with the help 
of the developed theoretical framework and the empirical evidence, discusses profoundly 
the potential effects of these representations in practice.  
However, as mentioned, the results of this study should be regarded as tentative. While 
several measures were taken to ensure trustworthiness and high quality of research, as an 
interpretive study with a relatively small sample, this study does not produce statistically 
generalizable results. Further, as the interviewees were chosen based on the access, it is 
likely the sample is not representative of all private banking professionals, let alone fi-
nance professionals or all investors. It could thus very well be that the mapping of the 
representations of investing and investors depicted in figure 1 is not comprehensive but 
needs to be developed further. Additionally, although the empirical findings of this study 
do fit and thus support the proposed theoretical framework, this study does not test the 
framework per se. 
Despite these limitations, the study does serve as a useful starting point for further 
inquiry into the social and cultural aspects of investing and financial phenomena. Poten-
tially fruitful topics for further research include the exact content and origin(s) of different 
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social groups’ (e.g. different finance professionals, big and small private investors, non-
investors) perceptions or social representations of investing and whether these do explain 
differences in investment behavior. Further, the theoretical framework based on social 
representation theory could also be used to investigate professional and non-professional 
investors’ sense-making and decision-making, i.e. how they turn information such as a 
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Purpose of the study: “I am interested in how Finnish finance professionals perceive 
themselves, their work and investing in general.” 
Instructions to the interview: anonymity and confidentiality guaranteed, recording ok? 
 
1. Demographic information and work 
Please describe your educational background and career so far 
Why did you decide to work in finance? 
What has kept you in this field? 
What are the pros of your work? 
What are the cons of your work? 
What is your typical workday like? 
What kind of knowledge or skills you need in your work? 
  
2. Culture, values and norms in the field 
Is it possible to say that there is some kind of culture or a feeling of togetherness among 
finance professionals? 
Could you describe this culture? 
Are there differences in culture between employers? 
Has finance as a field or professional investing somehow changed during your career? 
What kind of person succeeds in finance and why? 
What kind of person will not succeed in finance and why? 
What are the biggest mistakes a finance professional can make? 
Often finance is associated with the idea of competitiveness. What do you think about 
this? 
If perceived as competitive:  
How this competitiveness affects every day work life and its activities? 
Is finance as a field a ruthless dog-eat-dog world where only the fittest sur-
vive? 
What kind of role does collegiality have in finance? 
Finance is sometimes associated with hefty bonuses and even a luxurious lifestyle. What 





3. Financial markets and investing 
Who can become an investor? 
What do you think, why is it that Finnish people don’t engage more in investing? 
Why are finance professionals needed? What kind of value do you add to investing? 
How would you describe a good (professional/non-professional) investor? 
 
4. Investing and ir/rational decision-making 
How do you make the investment decisions? Could you describe the process of deciding 
(with the client or independently of them) where to invest the funds?  
Are emotions a part of investing and should they be?14 
Why / why not? 
Can emotions be harmful in investing? 
Can emotions be beneficial in investing? 
Is intuition a part of investing? 
Why / why not? 
How would you describe a good investment? 
  
5. Investing, ethics and responsibility 
What kind of role do ethics and moral have in investment activities? 
What are you as a finance professional responsible for and to whom? 
What is an investor in general responsible for and to whom?  
Who in the end is responsible for investing and its effects? (E.g. individual investors, 
banks and finance professionals, regulators and officials, policy makers or…?)  
 
6. Popular representations of investing, investors and financial markets 
Have you encountered misconceptions about financial markets, investing or investors? 
What kind of misconceptions? Where? How has these misconceptions? Why are 
the misconceptions, i.e. why are they wrong or untrue? 
Have you seen any fictional portrayals (e.g. movies) of the financial world?  
What do you think about this/these portrayal/s? 
 
7. Related to these themes and topics we have discussed, is there something else of 
importance that I didn’t ask yet? 
 
8. Lastly, why did you agree to this interview?  
                                                 
14 In Finnish the question was “Kuuluvatko tunteet sijoittamiseen?” which can be understood as “Are emo-
tions a part of investing?” but also as “Should emotions be a part of investing?”. Interviewees noticed and 
did discuss this in their answers. The same applies to the question about intuition in investing.  
